Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 54
Issue 6 Issue 6 - November 2001

Article 1

11-2001

Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism
and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate
Dan Markel

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Law and Society Commons

Recommended Citation
Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for the
Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 Vanderbilt Law Review 2157 (2001)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol54/iss6/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 54

NOVEMBER 2001

NUIMBER 6

Are Shaming Punishments
Beautifully Retributive?
Retributivism and the Implications
for the Alternative Sanctions Debate
Dan Markel*

I.

II.

III.

*

INTRODUCTION ................................................................
THE FALL AND RISE OF SHAMING PUNISHMENTS .........
A.
Shame's Demise....................................................
B.
The New Alternatives: Shame, Guilt, and the
PrivatePrison ......................................................
THE PROBLEMATICS OF SHAME ........................................
A.
What Is Shame?....................................................
B.
Why People Think Shaming Punishments Are
Beautifully Retributive.........................................
THE CONFRONTATIONAL CONCEPTION OF RETRIBUTION...
A.
Three Relations ....................................................

2158
2167
2167
2170
2177
2177
2179
2183
2184

Berkman Fellow, Harvard Law School. A.B., Harvard College; MXPhil., University of

Cambridge; J.D., Harvard Law School I am grateful to Matej Accetto, David Barron, Michael
Blake, Richard Epstein, Charles Fried, Bryan Garsten, Jim Von Der Heydt. Rob Howse, Duncan
Kennedy, Avery Kolers, Jennifer Llewellyn, Frank Michelman, Martha Minow, Herb Morris,
Martha Nussbaum, Richard Parker, Eric Posner, Matt Price, David Rosenberg, Joe Singer, Carol
Steiker, Bill Stuntz, Lloyd Weinreb, Jim Whitman, David Wilkins, and Jonathan Zittrain. who
helped me think through the issues here; to participants in the Berkman Center Legal Theory

Workshop; and to Lowell House, the Berkman Center for Internet &Society, O'Melveny &Myers
LIP, and the Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business at Harvard Law School for institutional support of this project. This Article is dedicated to David Charny, of blessed memory, a
beloved teacher and a cherished friend.

2157

VANDERBILTLAWREVIEW

2158

B.
C.
IV.

[Vol. 54:2157

1.
The Confrontational Relation .................... 2184
2.
The Socially Denunciative Relation ........... 2186
3.
The Common Good Relation ...................... 2191
The Internal Justification and Prima Facie Obligation of Retribution................................................ 2192
Retribution, Social Meaning, and Proportionality................................................................
2206

RETRIBUTION AND ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS ................... 2215

A.

Why Shaming Punishments Are Not "Beautifully
R etributive"............................ ............................. 2216
B.
Why Shaming Sanctions Are Illiberal.................. 2222
C.
The CCR and Guilt Punishments ......................... 2229
D.
The CCR and PrivatePrisons............................... 2232
CONCLUSION ................................................................... 2240

INTRODUCTION

In the last few years, scholars and policymakers in the area
of criminal justice have focused an increasing amount of attention
on two topics. The first is the retributivist theory of punishment
("retributivism");' the second is the development of alternative
sanctions to the orthodoxy of incarcerating criminals in publicly
managed prisons. 2 This Article is about what connections may
properly be drawn between what justifies punishment and how we
actually go about punishing offenders.
A preliminary word on retributivism may be helpful. Retributivism is a theory about retribution, and retribution's features,
or its definition, may be understood in either a weak or a strong
sense. The weak sense asserts that a criminal may be punished because, and only because, in some sense he "deserves" that punish-

1. See David Dolinko, The Future of Punishment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1719, 1720 (19909)
("[W]e can see that those seemingly antiquated retributive notions... have not only failed to
disappear, but have come roaring back with-one might say-a vengeance."); Stephen P. Garvey,
Punishmentas Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1835 (1999) C'[Retribution has lately received
renewed respect.").
2. See, e.g., Development in Law: Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1863,
1866-75 (1998) [hereinafter Alternatives to Incarceration];see also Stephen P. Garvey, Can
Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 733 (1998) (describing imprisonment as
the contemporary "punitive orthodoxy"); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 591 (1996) CImprisonment is the punishment of choice in American
jurisdictions.").
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ment, and that punishment should be meted out in proportion to
the wrong committed and the blameworthiness of the offender.
The strong sense incorporates the same desert and proportionality assertions, but also imposes an obligation: the criminal
must be punished, regardless of the consequences. Many people attribute the strong thesis to Kant,3 and, without doubt, some of his
4
most famous writings support that position.
The recent scholarly and policymaking interest in retributivism stems in part from negative reactions to problems associated
with recidivism, which indicate the failure of theories based on the
specific deterrence or rehabilitation of the offender." Yet retribution's renaissance has another explanation: the theory has a
stronger rationale than it once seemed to have. For many years,
defenders of retribution offered little justification for the basic retributive notion that criminals should be punished because they
deserve to suffer for their wrongdoing.6 They thought the concept of

3. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, FairnessVersus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961, 1230 (2001).
4. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 142 (Mary Gregor trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797). There Kant writes that even if "civil society were to be
dissolved by the common consent of all its members (e.g., if a people inhabiting an island decided
to separate and disperse throughout the world), the last murderer remaining in prison would
first have to be executed, so that each has done to him what his deeds deserve. . . . Id. The rest
of the sentence is supposed to explain why this is a duty-. "[so that] blood guilt does not cling to
the people for not having insisted upon this punishment; for otherwise the people can be regarded as collaborators in this public violation of justice." Id. As one might figure, this is only a
conclusory assertion, not argument in the usual sense.
Surprisingly perhaps, Kant is not always so categorical on the absolute duty to punish. He
writes that executive prerogative would allow the state to waive punishment of a criminal for
crimes against the state, such as treason. See, e.g., id. at 145. Hegers language also supports the
notion that there is a duty to punish, but there is little evidence to indicate that he would go as
far as Kant in saying that there is no value to life when a crime goes unpunished.
5. See Dolinko, supra note 1, at 1720; Andrew Von Hirsch, Penal Theories, in THE
HANDBOOK OF CRIE AND PUNISHMENT 659, 661, 666 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998). Specific deterrence posits that the experience of punishment by an offender will deter that offender from committing legal offenses in the future, after his punishment ends. Rehabilitation is a theory that
seeks to transform the views and capabilities of the offender so that when his period of rehabilitative punishment ends, he will be able to make socially beneficial contributions as a citizen. The
difference between these theories may be captured by the contrast between fear and hope. Specific deterrence might countenance a miserable punitive experience so that the person wishes to
avoid the experience again, whereas rehabilitation hopes to change the mind of the offender so as
to remove any motivation to commit legal offenses later. A rehabilitative experience might, on
such a view, permit a punitive experience that is considerably less miserable than one that a
theorist of specific deterrence would advocate. On the other hand, some rehabilitationists might
say that a tough love approach is a desideratum in transforming and rehabilitating the offender.
6. Stanley Benn's well-known account of punishment observed (and impliedly criticized)
the views of retributivists for denying that punishment needed any further justification. See
Stanley I. Benn, Punishment,in 7 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 29, 30 (Paul Edwards ed.,
1967).
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desert was self-evidently attractive. Critics charged that when retribution is characterized this way, the theory does not offer much to
elucidate why this intuition should be followed. 7 It seemed that one
could either agree with it or not.8 Those who agreed with the intuition were charged with having an insatiable psychological drive to
exact revenge on behalf of victims 9 or to express disgust at the
wrong for the sake of communal solidarity.10
Seen in this way, retributivism sure looks like thin gruel.
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to think that there could be no
plausible or attractive rationale for retribution. 1 The account I offer, which I call the Confrontational Conception of Retribution
(CCR), explains the goods inhering internally to the practice of retribution in a way that goes a good bit farther than merely repeating

7. The critics point out that "it simply does not follow from the fact that the criminal acted
wrongly-and, following Kants view, thereby willed that his maxim be adopted universally, that
the state acts rightly, rather than committing a further wrong, in imposing punishment." Kaplow
& Shavell, supra note 3, at 1233 n.668.
8. Compare, e.g., Hugo Bedau, Retribution and the Theory of Punishment, 75 J. PHIL. 601,
616 (1978) (Either the [retributivist] appeals to something else-some good end-that is accomplished by the practice of punishment, in which case he is open to the criticism that he has a
nonretributivist, consequentialist justification for the practice of punishment, Or his justification
does not appeal to something else, in which case it is open to the criticism that it is circular and
futile."), with MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 238-43 (1984) (relying on the "inherent
rightness of the practice" of giving an offender his just deserts as the basis for a formal syllogistic
defeat of utilitarian theories). Moore later says the justification for a theory that is not justified
by the consequences it engenders, such as retributivism, is that "it appeals to both our particular
judgments and our more general principles, in order to show that the theory fits judgments that
on reflection we are sure of, and principles that on reflection we are proud of." Id. As will become
clear, I reconceive what it means to understand something by the consequences it engenders. I
argue that an appeal such as Moore's to the "inherent rightness" of some act is often to rely on an
appeal to utility or well-being that is merely time-sliced, and therefore, balanced against the
utility that one would sense later on if one acted in an "unprincipled" manner. In other words,
principles perform certain functions for persons, such as lending narrative coherence to our personal identities, and it is their success in performing those functions that ought to have our
moral consideration, not the fetishization of those principles themselves. See ROBERT NOZICK,
THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 2-12 (1993).
9. See TED HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 30 (1969).
10. See, e.g., JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 152 (1967); see
also H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 159
(1968) (offering a hostile account that views retributivism "as useless obstructions to rational
thought"); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4-5 (1955) (providing a sympathetic account of noncognitive retribution).
11. The works of Jean Hampton and Jeffrie Murphy have contributed greatly here. See in.
fra note 138. The theory offered infra at Parts III and IV draws on these works but differs in
several significant respects, such as by emphasizing the political dimension to punishment and
by expressly incorporating an ex ante viewpoint on matters such as criminal legislation and
sentencing policy. The account here revises and extends further my previous attempt to understand retribution. See Dan Markel, The Justice of Amnesty? Towards a Theory of Retributivism
in Recovering States, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 389 (1999).
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the mantra that retributive justice requires punishment as a matter of just deserts. The goal is to help explain the attractiveness and
truth of retributivism in light of other moral claims that practical
reason leads us to believe. 12
Now, as mentioned earlier, the second area of this Article's
focus is the increasing exploration of alternatives to incarceration
in publicly managed prisons-that is, expanding the arsenal of
methods to punish. Some of these alternatives are stigmatic but do
not involve incarceration, such as criminal fines, "demeaning"
community service, and most controversially, shaming punishments. 13 Other alternatives are carceral and stigmatic, like chain
gangs, 14 while others are carceral but less stigmatic, such as mandatory detox programs. 15 Increasingly, some jurisdictions have devised imaginative "guilt" punishments. 16 And, although they do not
generate a markedly different experience than imprisonment in a
public prison, privately managed prisons have been authorized by
about half the states in the country and the federal government. 1'7

12. I leave aside a variety of metaethical issues in this paper and save them for a book in
progress, RethinkingRetribution,but I do think that for the limited purposes of this Article, it is
enough that the argument justifies a commitment to retribution by demonstrating its relation to
other principles we think are true and valuable, such as equality under law, individual moral
responsibility, and the value that one's life has when lived in fidelity to those notions, among
others.
13. Shaming punishments, as used in this Article, refer to punishments aimed at humiliating or degrading the offender in the public eye and invite the possibility of public participation in
the humiliation.
14. See Emily S. Sanford, Comment, The Proprietyand Constitutionalityof ChainGangs, 13
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1155, 1171-72 n.143 (1997) (detailing several states' recent embrace of chain
gangs).
15. See Alternatives to Incarceration,supra note 2, at 1898-99; Note, Winning the War on
Drugs: A "Second Chance" for Nonviolent Drug Offenders, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1485 (2000) (describing and endorsing such alternatives to incarceration).
16. Guilt punishments, as I define them for this Article, are punishments that aim at eliciting a moral awareness by the criminal of the specific legal wrongdoing he committed. Unlike
what I call shaming punishments, they are not aimed at humiliating the criminal. Moreover,
guilt punishments can be administered effectively without any crowds leering or jeering at the
criminal I discuss them at greater length infra at Part I.B.
17. See infra Parts I.B.3, IV.C. Private prisons are now authorized by over half the states
and the federal government. They are not strictly speaking an alternative to incarceration, but
they are a move away from the dominance of publicly managed prisons, and in this respect constitute an important development in penal practice that I want to address. As a result I imprecisely lump together shaming punishments, guilt punishments, and private prisons under the
rubric of "alternative sanctions." The following list provides a sampling of references to the relevant legislation authorizing such use. See 18 U.S.C. § 4013 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 33.30.031
(Lexis 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1609.01 (West 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-50-106
(Lexis 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-202 (West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 18-86b
(West 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 957.01-.16 (West 2001 & Supp. 2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §9
197.500-.990 (Lexis 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1800.4 (West Supp. 2001); MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 47-4-1 to -5, 47-5-1201 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-30-106 (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
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Proposals involving increased use of alternative sanctions
have attracted lots of attention, 18 in part because there are currently nearly two million people in state and federal prisons and
jails. 19 Frustrated by the apparent inability of the criminal justice
system to reduce criminal populations at a reasonable cost, various
scholars with different political agendas have united behind the
flag of finding cheaper and more effective methods to reduce crimi20
nal populations and recidivism.
Although broad coalitions have formed to support the expanded use of alternative sanctions as a general matter, intense
controversy has swirled around the use of shaming punishments. 2 1
When referred to in this Article, shaming punishments denote
state-sponsored punishments that are aimed at humiliating the offender by degrading the offender's status, 22 that is, by communicat-

209.141 (Michie 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-H:8 (2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1-17, 33-3-1
(Michie 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-37 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.06 (West 1999 & Supp.
2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 41 (West 1991); 1995 Ore. ALS 621 (LEXIS); 61 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 1081-1085 (West 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 41-24-101 to -117 (1997 & Supp.
2000); TEX. GOVT CODE ANN. §§ 495.001-.024 (Vernon 1998 * Supp. 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. §
64-13-26 (2000); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 53.1-261 to -266 (Michie 1998); W. VA. CODE §§ 25-5-1 to -20
(1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-22-101 to -115 (Michie 2001). Five more states (Hawaii, Idaho,
Kansas, Minnesota, and Missouri) have imprisoned criminals in privately managed facilities
without express authorization. See Warren L. Ratliff, The Due Process Failure of America's
Prison PrivatizationStatutes, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 371, 409-10 (1997). Interestingly, Illinois
has legislated against the use of private prisons altogether. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/1.4
(1995).
18. Reporters from The New York Times in particular seem fascinated with shaming pun.
ishments. In April, May, and June of 2001, there were three separate articles about the rise of
shaming punishments in America in The New York Times. Sarah Boxer, When Emotion Worms
Its Way into Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2001, at B7 (observing the "reflowering" of shaming punishments); Belinda Cooper, Righteous Indignation, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2001, at G35; Dean E.
Murphy, Justice as a Morality Play that Ends with Shame, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2001, at D5; see
also Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White CollarCriminals:A Proposalfor Reform of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 365 (1999) (noting that "shaming penal.
ties are on the rise in American law"); Jan Hoffman, Crime and Punishment:Shame GainsPopularity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1997, at Al (observing growth in use of shame sanctions).
19. See Corrections Statistics, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, at
http://www.ojp.us-doj.gov/bjs/correct.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2001).
20. See Dan M. Kahan, PunishmentIncommensurability,1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691 (1998).
21. See, e.g., Aaron S. Book, Shame on Yow An Analysis of Modern Shame Punishment as
an Alternative to Incarceration,40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1999) (defending shame sanctions
in various circumstances); Kahan, supra note 2, at 591 (urging greater use of shame sanctions);
Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American CriminalLaw, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880 (1991)
(criticizing shame sanctions as infeasible); James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting
Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1998) (criticizing shaming punishments); see also
Boxer, supra note 13 (observing the "reflowering" of shaming punishments); Sixty Minutes: Joe
the Jailer(CBS television broadcast, Feb. 11, 2001).
22. Note that, for the purposes of this Article, I am conflating the acts of shaming and humiliating someone. Herb Morris has suggested to me that this is too hasty. At first, however, I
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ing to others that he is a bad type. To realize that aim, shaming
punishments occur before the public eye, sometimes with the pub23
lic's participation.
While some academics have asserted that shaming punishments are compatible with every traditional justificatory theory of
punishment, 24 the major proponents of the pro-shaming punishments movement have appealed to the economic benefits of alternative sanctions. 25 These sanctions, according to their defenders, incur
lower social and financial costs but nonetheless deliver a comparable degree of punishment premium-a notion perhaps best understood as a compound of social expression of condemnation and de26
terrence.
Interestingly, both supporters and opponents of these alternative sanctions have concluded that retributivism, as a justification of punishment for wrongdoing, is fully compatible with the de27
ployment of shaming sanctions.

To my mind, the views of these scholars rest on misunderstandings of what retribution is really about.2 Indeed, a proper understanding of retribution reveals that shaming punishments are

was skeptical of this thought because I focused on the perspective of the object-person. It seems if
A viciously abuses B through verbal or physical attacks that are unjustified, B should not feel
humiliated, but rather angry. To be humiliated would indicate a lack of self-esteem or confidence. And if the attacks on B were justified, then Hs being humiliated also seems the wrong
reaction. But things do change when the perspective changes. Perhaps A is himself a sadist, and
wishes to humiliate B, but not necessarily to shame him, because A is not trying to make known
a moral statement about B, but rather wishes to communicate his own ontological indifference to
Hs worth. From this perspective, the distinction seems more crisp, and I am grateful to Professor
Morris for pointing this out.
23. I am not referring to what might be called reintegrative shaming punishments, which
have been advocated by those like John Braithwaite. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAM. AND
REINTEGRATION (1989). Those punishments attempt to shame an offender and then expressly
attempt to bring them back into the community through some integration ritual or ceremony.
These are not the punishments advocated by Kahan, Etzioni, or Posner, nor are they the sort
typically inflicted by state and federal courts.
24. See, e.g., Massaro, supranote 21, at 1880.
25. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 2, at 591 (focusing chiefly on the economic benefits of shaming punishments); see also Book, supra note 21, at 653; Kahan, supra note 20, at 704.
26. See Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621, 1656 (1998); Kahan, supra note 2, at 635.
27. See infra Part II.B.
28. One reason for the superficial treatment of the relation between retributivism and alternative sanctions might be that retributivism performs chiefly what H.L.A. Hart called a justificatory function in discussion about punishment, whereas the debate over alternatives to incarceration is not about why we (may or ought to) punish, but rather how we (ought to) punish.
Although this distinction is helpful, it is a mistake to think that motive and method can be so
neatly decdupled. For as this Article will show, the method used to punish has implications for
determining whether a duty to punish has been discharged or perhaps even violated, and which
justification one employs might constrain the range of responses a state may apply to a criminal.
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not, as Professor Whitman has called them, "beautifully retributive," 29 but rather are entirely inconsistent with retributivism.
But the Article aims at more than merely this descriptive
claim. For ultimately, the CCR is a normative account: it answers
why, if at all, we ought to punish offenders of legal norms. In answering that question, the CCR reveals resources for thinking
about how we ought to punish. The Article, then, performs three
tasks. First, as suggested above, it explains why shaming punishments are antithetical to the retributivist viewpoint. Second, the
CCR, by showing the social practice of retribution to have its own
internal intelligibility, responds to criticisms that claim that retribution rests on no more than a slogan that just deserts requires
punishment. 30 Finally, the account offers constructive suggestions
to the alternative sanctions debate by giving qualified endorsement
for the use of alternative sanctions such as the use of guilt punishments and privately managed prisons. By the end of the Article,
then, I hope to have encouraged critics of retribution to join the retributivist camp. But I also hope to have disturbed the settled views
of those who may already self-identify as retributivists.
Although the CCR bears resemblance to prior retributivist
accounts, it also makes several departures from the prior literature.
First, by explaining the internal goods achieved by retribution, the
CCR offers an alternative to the "intuitionist" defense of retribution. 3 1 Second, the CCR posits retribution as one attractive social
practice among many other attractive social practices within a
complex scheme of social cooperation. It thus illuminates the demands and limits that any claim of justice may properly have on a
scheme of cooperation designed to help individuals flourish as best
they can. Thus, in contrast to accounts of retribution that ignore
both the political dimensions and moral consequences of punish-

29.

Whitman, supranote 21, at 1062.

30.

I articulate only those features of the CCR needed to make my point here, but in future

work, I explain certain foundational matters in greater depth. I should mention that the account

I offer makes no attempt to address systematically a set of questions regarding aspects like the
criminal procedures surrounding the institution of punishment, the role of judges, prosecutors,
and legislators, and the potential role of mercy or forgiveness. It also does not provide a definitive answer on whether principles other than retribution may adequately guide punishment
policy in a liberal state.
31. The CCR is a conception of punishment whose justification rests not upon an intuition
but rather upon principles of practical reason that would lead one to support various practices
and institutions. The idea of practical reason that I rely upon borrows in part from the account
offered in JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 322-32 (1980).
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ment,32 the CCR finds great power by envisioning retribution from
an ex ante perspective. 33 As a result, the CCR can be sensitive to a
range of institutional concerns that would affect interpretations of
what counts as appropriate punishment. Finally, by explaining
what justifies punishment, the CCR develops a rationale that has
interesting but not overdetermined implications for answering the
question of how much or what kind of punishment should be inflicted on offenders.
The Article unfolds in four parts. Part I gives a brief overview of the fall and rise of shaming punishments and other "alternative sanctions" in the United States. Part II begins by distinguishing between what I call shame punishments and guilt punishments. I then show how, in recent years, various legal scholars
have identified a strong and friendly relationship between retributivism and shaming punishments. As noted above, this alleged
friendship rests upon what I think is a faulty understanding of
what retribution is about.
Part III lays the foundation for this criticism by developing
the CCR. This part tries to show the internal intelligibility of retribution by explaining the justifications for seeking retribution. In
very short form, the justifications of retribution for wrongdoing are
threefold: retribution effectuates the ideal of treating human beings
as responsible moral agents; it diminishes the plausibility of a
criminal's claim to superiority over others; and it serves as a state's
self-defense mechanism against the illegitimate usurpation of political power by a criminal. Note that these three justifications, or
moral goods, are achieved without reference to the consequences of
the retributive encounter. This is what makes them internal justifications. I also try to explain what makes retribution a prima facie

32. Herbert Morris's famous work, Personsand Punishment,was a rare exception inthe literature because it took seriously the task of situating punishment as a political practice. See
Herbert Morris, Personsand Punishment,in PUNISHiENTAND REHABILITATION 40,42 (Jeffrie G.
Murphy ed., 1973). Morris thought that retribution is deserved for criminal wrongs because a
criminal's action "renounces a burden which others have voluntarily assumed and thus [be]
gains an advantage which others.., do not possess." Id. Thus punishment was necessary to end
free riding on the political agreement of others. The problem here is that we do not punish in
order to end free riding itself, but rather to achieve social goals such as security in person and
property and to communicate moral norms to offenders and nonoffenders alike. The fact that free
riding might terminate by threat of punishment is a consequence of retribution but not its purpose.
33. By ex ante perspective, I refer to a perspective where a person internalizes all available
information about possible outcomes except the identity of what position one will occupy later.
This "ideal observer" status guarantees an element of impartiality that would better yield the
practices and policies for an attractive society and state.
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duty in light of these internal justifications.3 4 The effect of the argument, I suggest, is to render retribution an internally intelligible
and attractive social practice. But like all social practices, retribution cannot assert an absolute claim on our moral imaginations. I
try to explain why this is the case, and thus why retribution's goods
35
are to be pursued only as a prima facie obligation.
Having presented the CCR for greater inspection, I return in
Part IV to alternative sanctions. Here I begin by examining shaming punishments through the lens of the CCR. I argue initially that
shaming punishments risk improperly inviting social forces, or
what James Whitman has called the crowd, to participate in the
state's responsibility of retribution. But upon further scrutiny, this
improper invitation of the crowd is ultimately an insufficient reason
to reject shaming punishments, at least in most cases. The real
problem with shaming punishments, I argue, is that they ignore the
dignity-bearing nature of an autonomous moral agent, the very
autonomy that motivates the ideals underlying retributivism. Further, the reason people have attributed a compatibility between
shame and retribution is, I argue, due to their confusion of revenge
with retribution. Once the two concepts are made distinct, it becomes evident that shaming punishments both rely upon and cultivate an emotional disposition that is inappropriate to retributivism.
Moreover, unlike Whitman, who views the participation of the
crowd as a concern extraneous to traditional liberal theories of the
state, my argument indicates precisely why a liberal theory of the
state proscribes the use of shaming as a practice of retribution.
I then argue that although retribution forecloses most types
of current shaming punishments, it by no means need end all at-

34. A prima facie duty or obligation refers to an obligation for which there is good moral
reason to do (or forbear) a certain act in the absence of countervailing concerns. Moral obliga.
tions compete with each other, of course, and so a general obligation to keep a promise to meot
someone for example may be overridden by an urgent obligation to rescue a life. For a discussion
of this in a legal context, see DAVID LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RuLE OF LAW 208-14 (1984).

35. Briefly, the status of retribution as a social obligation will have to compete with other
social obligations. One can imagine an external end that might "trump" an internal end-and
thus render the duty to punish "prima facie"-by positing a situation of imminent and total ca-

tastrophe. For example, when a society is on the brink of extermination due to war or famine, it
would be reasonable to spend fewer resources on investigating, prosecuting, and incarcerating

(certain types of) offenders than in "normal" periods of social stability and relative prosperity.
Alternatively, other duties might also present themselves, such as a duty to aid those in need, or
a duty to respect certain constitutional rights. Thus, a retributivist might think, without contradiction, that although a criminal deserves punishment on the merits, he should not be punished
if, say for example, his constitutional procedural rights were violated. For this, among other
reasons, I discuss the prima facie duty to punish, precisely because other moral commitments
may be at stake.
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tempts to rethink alternatives to the publicly managed prison.
Thus, I explain how the CCR may be given expression through alternatives such as "guilt" punishments and even the careful use of
prison-services corporations. My hope is that Part IV will demonstrate nonintuitive and compelling policy implications of this renewed retributivism, and thus spur reconsideration of what consti36
tutes attractive punishment in a society such as ours.
I. THE FALL AND RISE OF SHAMING PUNISHMENTS
My goal in this part is to illustrate three simple points. First,
from the colonial period until the nineteenth century, authorities in
America used a wide array of punitive methods including shaming
punishments. Second, until the last decade or so the reliance on
shaming punishments or other consciously stigmatic methods of
punishment had been largely displaced by a devotion to incarceration, fines, and probation. And third, we are now witnessing an increase in the use of privately managed prisons and alternatives to
incarceration, including the rise of shaming and "guilt" punishments. The justifications for the increase in these alternatives are
also explored here.
Punishment can be roughly divided into five kinds of deprivation: life (execution); liberty (incarceration); personal security
(corporal violence); property (fines and forfeitures); and dignity or
reputation (shaming).3 7 In practice, of course, these categories often
bleed into each other, or two or more punishments are used together. A period of incarceration, for instance, may involve certain
deprivations of property and dignity in addition to liberty. The focus of this Article, however, will be on the sorts of alternative punishments that attack an offender's "dignity."
A. Shame's Demise
Colonial America employed a variety of tools and practices to
respond to legal wrongdoing. Because Americans lived in smaller
communities and were less likely than today to move between
communities, they were far more sensitive to threats to their repu-

36. To be sure, the policy choices encouraged here are not required under the prevailing
mode of current constitutional jurisprudence. They are, however, permitted. Thus the arguments
here have to be developed as choices the polity makes collectively, through legislation at both the
federal and state level.
37.

Whitman, supra note 21, at 1060.
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tation and good name.3 8 For example, in colonial Virginia, punishments occupied the weak form of admonitions, where an offender
was lectured or scolded in private by a magistrate or clergyman and
then brought before an open court "for a formal admonition by the
magistrate, a public confession of wrongdoing, and a pronouncement of sentence, wholly or partially suspended to symbolize the
39
community's forgiveness."
This commingling of church and state institutions in responding to wrongdoing was hardly atypical. Congregations often
witnessed a scene in which an offender came before them to confess
his sins, with the offender garbed in white cloth seeking redemption
through forgiveness. 40 Labeling an offender could take two forms:
temporary or permanent. The temporary kind constituted a reintegrative shaming sanction because it was designed to signify the
wrongness of the offender's actions, but when the period of shaming
was over, it would indicate the community's attempt to embrace the
offender again. 41 More serious offenses, however, resulted in permanent maiming or branding of permanent letters or signs on offenders. In addition to shaming the offender, these punishments
usually helped disable the offender from causing more harm and
warned those who might interact with the offender about his crimi42
nal past.
Other methods of punishment sought to couple physical restraint with emotional humiliation before the public, often in a
manner reflective of the crime committed. Someone who stole cabbages would be placed in the pillory with cabbages placed on his
head. 43 Pillories, stocks, branding, maiming-all of these were used
as tools of public punishment prior to the use of jails and penitentiaries. 44 But these were not the only means of punishment used in

38. See Alternatives to Incarceration,supra note 2, at 1870 (noting the "goldfish-bowl-liko
existence of a colonial citizen"); Massaro, supranote 21, at 1912 (describing the "ultrasonsitivity"
of individuals within colonial communities).
39. Adam J. Hirsch, From Pillory to Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal Incarceration in
Early Massachussetts,80 MICH.L. REV. 1179, 1224 (1982).
40. Massaro, supranote 21, at 1913.
41. See id. For more information on reintegrative shaming sanctions, see BRAITHWAITE, su.
pra note 23.
42. Hirsch, supra note 39, at 1228.
43. Massaro, supra note 21, at 1914.
44.

See ALICE MORSE EARLE, CURIOUS PUNISHMENTS OF BYGONE DAYS 29-56, 138-49 (Sing-

ing Tree Press 1968) (1896).
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the United States. 45 Public whipping was popular in the colonies, in
particular for crimes committed by slaves or servants.4 6 Sometimes,
convicts were "exposed," that is, required to stand in front of crowds
for a designated period of time, usually an hour, and forced to hold
a sign describing one's transgression, issue public apologies, or to
47
do some form of labor intended to attract attention to themselves.
Fines, as well as measures of restitution to victims, may have been
the most common form of punishment. 48 But banishment from a
community was also common.
As can be seen, the early period of American law enforcement used shaming punishments extensively, but hardly exclusively. Over the next two hundred years, the use of shame as a penal method would decline rather dramatically as prisons grew in
popularity.
Our modern system, which relies heavily on the use of prisons (and to a lesser degree, fines), finds its roots in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and in the development of the
penitentiary. 49 After the Revolution's broad-based social dislocations, self-proclaimed reformers sought to "rationalize" punishment
and reduce the use of pillories and executions. 0 Developed as a partial response to the perceived decline in the utility of shaming punishments, 51 incarceration of the criminal soon became the dominant
penal response. 52 By the time of President Jackson, prisons grew to
be the prevailing mode of punishment. 53

45.

For general overviews, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PuNISHM.MEN

AMERICAN

HISTORY

(1993);

EDWIN

POWERS,

CRMIE

AND

PUNISHIENT

IN

IN

EARLY

MASSACHUSSETTS, 1620-1692, at 195-211 (1980).
46. FRIEDMAN, supranote 45, at 37.
47. See POWERS, supra note 45, at 199-200; Whitman, supranote 21, at 1061.
48.

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 45, at 38.

49. See generally George Fisher, The Birth of the PrisonRetold, 104 YALE LJ. 1235 (1995).
Modes of incarceration, however, were not completely unfamiliar in colonial periods. Usually,
jails were used to house debtors and defendants before their trials, and workhouses were for
"vagrants" or "idlers." See FRIEDMAN, supra note 45, at 48-50; Harry Elmer Barnes, The Historical Origin of the Prison System in America, 12 J. CRI. L. & CRIIINOLOGY 35, 36-37 (1920).
reprintedin POLICE, PRISON, AND PUNISHMENT 11, 12 (Kermit L Hall ed., 1987).
50. See Alternatives to Incarceration,supra note 2, at 1873.
51.

See ADAM J. HIRSCH, THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY: PRISONS AND PUNISHF.N" IN

EARLY AMERICA 35 (1992) (observing that demographic changes in America diminished the efficacy of reputational punishment).
52. See Kahan, supranote 2, at 612.
53. See David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison-UnitedStates, 1789.1865, in THE OXTORD
HISTORY OFTHE PRISON 111 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995).
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Though there were contentious debates over the desirability
system, 54 the idea of separating deviants from the rest
the
prison
of
of society and isolating them from each other gradually took hold,
and by the Civil War, penitentiaries had been built across the nation. 55 Of course, other forms of punishment, such as forced labor,
persisted-but they eventually disappeared under litigation attacks.56 Until only recently, the dominant use of the prison and probation constituted what one scholar has called a "punitive ortho57
doxy."
B. The New Alternatives: Shame, Guilt, and the PrivatePrison
That punitive orthodoxy is now being challenged, as recent
years have witnessed an increasing interest in alternatives to incarceration in publicly managed prisons. 58 This section describes
only three of the developments in the ongoing project of reimagining punishment: shame punishments, guilt punishments,
59
and private prisons.
By far, the most controversial recent developments have centered on the return of shaming punishments.6 0 These bear a strik-

54. See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER
IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (rev. ed. 1971), excerpted in POLICE, PRISON, AND PUNISHMENT 622, 637
(Kermit L. Hall ed. 1987).
55. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 45, at 155; Alternatives to Incarceration,supra note 2, at
1874. Incarceration today might be viewed as just a bit different from the use of banishment or
excommunication in earlier days, as both penalties isolate and castigate the offender from the
social intercourse of everyday life in the community in which the wrong was committed.
56. As Margo Schlanger notes, "a number of prison systems of the former Confederate
states... were run for many years on a 'plantation' model. These self-financing forced-labor farm
prisons were direct heirs to the slave plantation and the near-slavery systems of labor peonage
and convict-leasing that succeeded the end of Reconstruction in the South." Margo Schlanger,
The Courts: Beyond the Hero Judge: InstitutionalReform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 1994, 2027 (1999) (book review) (citations omitted).
57. See Garvey, supra note 2, at 733 (describing contemporary "punitive orthodoxy" as comprising prison and probation).
58. See Boxer, supra note 18; Cooper, supra note 18; Murphy, supra note 18.
59. This Article does not include discussion of other methods. See, e.g., Alternatives to Incarceration,supra note 2, at 1895, (electronic monitoring), 1898-21 (prison boot camps), 1903 & n.40
(coerced abstinence programs); Annesley I. Schmidt, Electronic Monitoring: What Does the LiteratureTell Us?, 62 FED. PROBATION 10 (1998) (electronic monitoring). These innovations attract
less academic and popular attention than the more controversial use of shaming and guilt punishments, and prison-service corporations. This Article, frankly, does nothing to correct this
imbalance in attention. The argument, however, for the CCR might be able to ground theoretically the use of selected alternative measures in a more coherent way than seems currently
available.
60. The irony has been observed that shaming punishments, whose use declined as a result
of changing demographic trends in the United States at the end of the eighteenth century, are
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ing resemblance to the scarlet letter punishments of yore. 61 Shaming punishments, as I suggested in the Introduction, are penalties
that intentionally stigmatize an offender before public view and
may invite some element of public participation in that stigmatization. 62 The stigma might attach to the offender personally. For example, convicted shoplifters have been compelled to attire themselves in T-shirts saying "I am on felony probation for theft."6
Sometimes the offender must display himself before the public,
wearing sandwich boards on busy streets that say, for example, "I
got caught possessing cocaine. Ordered by Judge Whitfield."6 In
Kansas City, Missouri, the faces and names of men convicted of soliciting prostitutes are displayed on "John TV," a local access channel.65 And, as in the "exposures" of colonial periods, judges have required offenders to confess their offenses in church 66 or recite prepared (and court-approved) shaming speeches on the steps of court67
houses.
Sometimes the judge meting out the shaming punishment
wants the stigma to attach to the offender's property. Convicted

now being advocated again by a variety of academics, even though the demographic shifts that
reduced shaming's effectiveness have, if anything, accelerated. See Alternatives to Incarceration,
supra note 2, at 1873 n.55.
61. Scarlet letter punishments gained immortal fame through NATHANIEL HA%0"THORNE,
THE SCARLET LETTER (Chandler Pubrg Co. 1968) (1850). These punishments of 'bygone days"
centered on the publicity of the offender's wrongdoing. See EARLE, supra note 44, at 86-95;
POWERS, supra note 45, at 198-201.
62. I do not deny that virtually all forms of punishment, whether imprisonment or otherwise, stigmatize the offender. But shaming punishments may fairly be said to differ from prison,
fines, and most forms of community service in that they are directed primarily at stripping the
dignity from someone, in public, as a spectacle. Shaming punishments are designed to express to
the public that this offender is a bad person. Will there be some nonshaming punishments that
nonetheless instigate feelings of guilt, or alternatively, shame? Emphatically, yes. But by defining shaming punishments as penalties that aim at humiliation or degradation in a public manner, I think we can create a general zone of clarity about the intended referent.
63. See People v. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681, 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (overturning condition of probation requiring such attire).
64. CBS Morning News: Eye on America (CBS television broadcast, May 16, 1997); see also
Ann Woolner, When Sentence Is a Shame, AM. LAW., Nov. 1997, at 34 (describing sentence of
convicted thief in Georgia who was required to walk around the courthouse for extended periods
of time with a sign saying, "I AM A CONVICTED THIEF").
65. See Edward Walsh, Kansas City Tunes in as New ProgramAims at Sex Trade: "John
TV " WASH. PosT, July 8, 1997, at A3. See generally Courtney Guyton Persons, Note, Sex in the
Sunlight- The Effectiveness, Efficiency, Constitutionality,and Advisability of PublishingNames
and Pictures of Prostitutes'Patrons,49 VAND. L. REV. 1525 (1996).
66. See Judge OrdersMan to Confess Crime in Church, UPI, Jan. 7, 1984. These forced confessions may present other problems for a liberal order. Though these confessional apologies are
often presented under the terms of a plea arrangement, they could be challenged because they
violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
67. See David Doege, Shaming Sentences Group Is Di'erse, MILWAUKEE J. SFNT., Apr. 6,
1997, at 1.
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drunk drivers in some counties have to affix bumper stickers proclaiming "CONVICTED: DWI," 68 while sex offenders are required to
post signs on their home and driveway that read "DANGEROUS
SEX OFFENDER-NO CHILDREN ALLOWED." 69 Some might say
that these offender notices should be viewed not as shaming punishments, but rather as devices to warn people of potential dangers.
But if this were truly the goal, other means could be adopted with70
out the shaming element.
What makes something a shaming punishment is that the
penalty "expose[s] the offender to public view and heap [s] ignominy
upon him in a way that other alternative sanctions to imprisonment, like fines and community service, do not."7 1 Posting names

and faces on the World Wide Web or in other public places are the
modern-day equivalent of the stocks: as one story put it, they might
be called "cyber-pillories." 72 Of course, one difference between these
penalties and the shaming sanctions of colonial America is that we
do not expect passersby to assault physically those who are the object of the shaming punishment. When an offender was placed in
the stocks, throwing rotten eggs was permitted, whereas today we
do not expect to incite lynch mobs when we post people's names on
a website with an advertisement of their crime. We expect that
background laws will protect the criminal from the crowd in a way

68. See People v. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146, 147 (N.Y. 1995).
69. See State v. Bateman, 771 P.2d 314, 316, 322 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (en banc), overruled in
part by State v. Anderson, 833 P.2d 321, 323 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (en banc); State v. Burdin, 924
S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tenn. 1996) (requiring posting of sign describing resident of home as convicted
child molester).
70. In the case of sex offender notification statutes, in which a neighborhood is told about
the presence of a released convict, it is unclear that a large sign on the person's property is required. An alternative would be to send a letter to houses in the relevant neighborhood; this
would probably be equally effective in communicating the risk the convict may pose, and less
stigmatizing. Or, if we really were concerned about a person's danger as a sex offender, we could
condition his release upon his taking testosterone suppressants or sterilization. Sending letters
would not work in the case of a car, since you cannot communicate a warning to everyone on the
roads. But it strikes me as disingenuous to say that putting a bumper sticker on someone's car
serves the purpose of adequate warning: people driving in front of the DWI convict's car, for
example, will usually not know what is "lurking" behind them. The better answer here is to
condition release upon a limitation of driving privileges to daytime, to require another person in
the car, or to require that the convict drive a car installed with automated breathalyzers such
that the ignition will not start without an appropriately low blood alcohol level. Another way to
address this would be to place a bumper sticker of a certain color (without text) on a car owned
by someone who has been a dangerous driver in the past, without specifying whether the danger
was caused by alcohol, slow reflexes, or road rage. If we are concerned with the safety hazards
people pose, then they should be classed together, rather than individually stigmatized, and
their driving privileges should be reduced.
71. Garvey, supra note 2, at 737.
72. See Now, CyberPilloryStocks, NA''L L.J., July 7, 1997, at A8.
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that they did not in earlier generations. However, the high incidence of vigilantism in the last few years suggests that this expec73
tation may no longer be reasonable.
The reintroduction of shaming punishments has been vigorously advocated by Dan Kahan, Eric Posner, and Amitai Etzioni.74
In What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, the first of a series of influential articles on the subject, Kahan lamented the fact that deprivation of liberty in the form of incarceration served as the dominant penal method in America today.75 Imprisonment, Kahan argued, is not only too "harsh and degrading for offenders," especially
for nonviolent offenders, but also "extraordinarily expensive for society. ' 76 And yet, despite the alleged unanimity on the desirability

of alternative sanctions that Kahan found among "theorists of
widely divergent orientation," 77 Kahan found that alternative sanctions were relatively rare five years ago because they failed to
of
communicate "the dimension of severity or 'bite' " that all forms
78
feasible.
politically
be
to
are
they
if
express
should
punishment
Imprisonment, by contrast, makes "offenders suffer," and the
suffering criminals undergo is the direct result of a "special social
convention that signifies moral condemnation." 79 In a free society,
Kahan writes, liberty is the most valued good, and to deprive it
from someone is to condemn that person in the way society most
powerfully can, aside from capital punishment. But with other al-

73. Recent years have seen a host of incidents of vigilantism. See, e.g., Jenny A. Montana,
Note, An Ineffective Weapon in the FightAgainst Child Sexual Abuse New Jersey's Megan's Law,
3 J.L. & POL'Y 569, 579 (1995) (detailing incidents of death threats or attacks on released sex
offenders); Jane A. Small, Note, Who Are the People in Your Neighborhood?Due Process,Public
Protection, and Sex Offender Notification Laus, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1451, 1467-68 (1999) (C'any
sex offenders have been physically assaulted. A gunman riddled one sex offender's home with
bullets after receiving notification. When members of Joseph G.'s community were notified that
he was to be released, they held a rally that culminated in the burning of his house. George H., a
repeat sex offender whose address had been publicly released, answered his door and was
punched in the mouth. Many others have faced violence in their communities at the hands of
angry neighbors." (citations omitted)).
74. See also Book, supra note 21, at 653 ("Shaming punishment sets an example for others
and provides the public with a tangible sense of justice in action."). It should be noted that Eric
Posner, though an advocate of shaming punishments for white collar criminals, has not embraced all of Kahan's enthusiasm for shaming. He observes that the effects of shaming punishments may be quite unpredictable, driving some offenders into deviant subcommunities that will
foster rather than remove antisocial conduct. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 10003 (2000).
75. Kahan, supra note 2, at 591-92.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 593; see also Kahan, supra note 20, at 704 (arguing that shaming punishments
are the "leading candidate" for sanctions that "meaningfully condemn" wrongdoers).
79. Kahan, supra note 2, at 593.
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ternative sanctions, especially fines and community service options,
there is an ambiguity in the social message conveyed. After all, Kahan explains, community service is something every citizen should
be encouraged to perform.8 0 And when we fine someone, doesn't that
create the sense that there is merely a cost attached to certain behavior, like a tax on speeding? 81 Because of this ambiguity, Kahan
argues that we need to use stigmatic forms of shame to convey better social disgust at the offenses of the criminal and, to a degree, at
the criminal himself.82 The shaming punishment supported by Kahan involves one or more of the following elements: stigmatizing
83
publicity, literal stigmatization, self-debasement, and contrition.
The virtue of shaming punishments, Kahan and Posner argued in a
later article, is that they destroy an offender's reputation more effectively and totally than fines do, and, by humiliating him publicly, render the offender's future reintegration into society more

to the extent
difficult: people will avoid dealing with the offender
84

possible because he is known to be "a bad type."
Noted communitarian theorist and sociologist Amitai Etzioni
has similarly argued for a return to the use of shaming punishments. In his article, Back to the Pillory?, Etzioni argued that
shaming punishments should be used not only for criminals, but
even "bad Samaritans." Bad Samaritans-those who could have
helped prevent a savage crime with low or no risk to themselves-should have their names posted
on a Web site and in advertisements (paid for by the offenders) in key newspapers.
Such postings would remove any remaining ambiguities about what society expects
from people who can help others when there is no serious risk to their own wellbeing. And those with a weak conscience or a faltering civic sense would be nudged
to do the right thing by fearing that their names would be added to the list of bad

80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 648-53. Kahan has continued in his quest to extend shaming punishments by
arguing that the federal sentencing guidelines should incorporate shaming punishments for
white collar criminal offenders. See Kahan & Posner, supra note 18. But see John B. Owens,
Have We No Shame? Thoughts on Shaming, "White Collar"Criminals,and the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1047 (2000) (arguing that elements of Kahan and Posner's
proposals are either redundant or ineffective).
83. Kahan, supranote 2, at 631-34.
84. See Kahan & Posner, supra note 18, at 370-71. What Kahan and Posner overlook is that
if they are correct, and if the reputation of an offender is completely destroyed by the measures
they endorse, the punishment of the offenders never ends, thus vitiating an important possibility
that an offender can be punished and then "move on" in some manner productive to society.
Without an effort to reintegrate the offender akin to the kind of shaming ceremonies advocated
by John Braithwaite, Kahan and Posner posit a punishment that effectively ends the life of the
offender by taking away all his dignity. Compare the rabbinic proverb that to shame a person is
to murder him, as you drain the blood from his face.
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Samaritans, that their friends and families would chide them, that their neighbors
would snicker.87

Etzioni argues that shaming punishments are "relatively light, especially if one takes into account that most other penalties shame
in addition to inflicting their designated hurt."86
One benefit of shaming, according to Etzioni, is its "deeply
democratic" character:
Shaming reflects the community's values and hence cannot be imposed by the authorities against a people. Thus, if being sent to the principal's office is a badge of
honor in a boy's peer culture, no shaming will occur in that situation. A yellow
star, imposed to mark and shame Jews in Nazi Germany, is now worn as a matter
of pride in Israel. Thus, people are protected better from shaming than from other
forms of punishment, punishment that can be imposed by authorities without the
specific consent of those who are governed.87

Another aspect of shaming punishments that Etzioni and
Kahan both observe and even celebrate is that criminals often
choose the shaming punishment as a substitute for traditional
forms of incarceration when given the choice between them. According to Kahan, offenders often prefer the shame sanction to prison.As
But Etzioni acknowledges that some offenders are ambivalent about
this choice:
An accountant who had been sentenced to stand in his neighborhood with a sign
that said "I embezzled funds" seemed deeply distraught when interviewed, musing
that he might have been better off if he had instead accepted a jail sentence. A
woman convicted of welfare fraud in Eau Claire, Wisconsin, preferred to be jailed
than to wear a sign admitting "I stole food from poor people."3

Academics are obviously not the only ones in favor of shaming punishments, since judges and sheriffs are the ones meting
them out.90 It is unclear, though, whether judges are employing
shaming punishments to economize on the costs of punishment or
because they perceive the shaming punishments as more effective
forms of expressing social condemnation. This latter sense is captured in a comment by Texas State District Judge Ted Poe, a judge
well-known for his use of shaming sanctions: "[A] little shame goes

85. Amitai Etzioni, Back to the Pillory?,AM. SCHOLAR, Summer 1999, at 43, 44.
86. Id. at 46.
87. Id. at 47. Etzioni's comment also applies to the appropriation of the pink triangle by
homosexual activist groups as a badge of gay pride.
88. Kahan, supra note 2, at 641 n.204, 646.
89. Etzioni, supra note 85, at 48.
90. See Owens, supra note 82, at 1055-57 (discussing federal cases of shaming punishments
permitted by the Sentencing Guidelines); cf. JOE ARPAIO, AMERICA'S TOUGHEST SHERIFF. HOW
WE CAN WIN THE WAR AGAINST CRIME (1996) (describing some of the shaming ordeals inflicted
on Maricopa County convicts).
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a long way. Some folks say everyone should have high self-esteem,
but that's not the real world. Sometimes people should feel bad."9 1
The recrudescence of shaming punishments has not been the
only controversial development in penal methods in recent years.
Some cases have involved penalties that appear, at least from our
current baseline, very weird. In one notorious case, a Tennessee
court ordered a law enforcement official to accompany the victim of
a burglary to enter the burglar's home unannounced to take something of similar value from the burglar.9 2 Some convicts are required to shovel manure, while in other cases negligent slumlords
in New York City are forced into house arrest in their own decrepit
tenements.9 3 San Francisco has required men convicted of soliciting
prostitutes to sit through lectures by former prostitutes who describe the unfortunate conditions of life on the streets. 94 Someone
who assaulted an interracial couple was forced to watch Mississippi
95
Burning a movie about violence in the civil rights era.
At their worst, some punishments degrade not only the punished but also harm the citizens responsible for implementing these
punishments. 96 But this need not be the case. Some examples-sitting through lectures, house arrest in one's below-code
apartment, watching movies, even doing hard labor-are instances
of guilt-inducing punishments that have an enormous potential for
what might be called "moral education." Depending on how they are
structured, these guilt punishments may educate in a manner similar to traditional pedagogy (classroom and teacher), or, somewhat
more obliquely, the punishments might involve a type of educational activity that can be refracted through a richer understanding
of lex talionis (LT), known more crudely but familiarly as the Mosaic concept of "an eye for an eye." 97 None of this is to deny that
shaming punishments may also yield morally educative experiences; but the distinction that I want to make is that guilt punish-

91.
92.

Etizoni, supra note 85, at 47-48.
See Joe B. Brown, Judge Devises Instructional Penalties,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1993, at

B16 (observing that victims often take back "what was taken from them" by the burglars).
93. See Instead of Jai" 'Welcome, Reptile!," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1988, at A22 [hereinafter
"Instead of Jail"I.
94. See Michael J. Ybarra, Patrons Given a Graphic View of Prostitution,N.Y. TIMES, May
12, 1996, § 1, at 18.
95. See Man Sentenced to See "MississippiBurning," UPI, Mar. 9, 1989.
96. Cf. Bob Herbert, Inside the Death House, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2000, at A21 (describing
the trauma of the Texan executioners in dealing with their jobs on the "tie-down" team).
97. See Garvey, supra note 2. For an instructive reconceptualization of lex talionis, see Jeremy Waldron, Lex Talionis, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 25 (1992). In Part IV, infra, I say more about the
relationship between lex talionis and retribution.
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ments do not depend upon scorn and castigation to be effective. I
say a bit more on this in the next part.
One last development that I want to highlight is the reemergence of the privately operated prison. In the nineteenth century,
just after the Civil War, various Confederate states were close to
bankruptcy, and one of the ways they raised cash was by auctioning
off the control of the state's inmates, prisons, and equipment to entrepreneurs who would hire out the prisoners to work for private
companies and capture the spread between the price of prison labor
and the costs of maintaining that labor force.98 Predictably, prisoners had no rights to speak of and conditions were, in a word, inhumane. 99 Over time, the states reassumed responsibility for their
prisoner populations, until, in the wake of the deregulation trend
that began in the 1980s under President Reagan, the privatization
of prisons reemerged as a cost savings mechanism. 100 But in contrast to the sale of prison labor to private companies that characterized the nineteenth century "privatization," today's market for
prison services has the state paying the costs of incarceration to
private contractors. 1 1 The reemergence of the privately run penal
institution raises various questions for policymakers: public accountability, penal effectiveness, and allocational efficiency. But it
is a mistake to assume that all of these questions are in any sense
new, as federal and state governments have contracted with private
parties throughout this nation's history to provide a range of services.
II. THE PROBLEMATICS OF SHAME

A. What Is Shame?
Before we can see how the relationship between retribution
and shame has been misunderstood, I need to say a bit more about
what shame is-in particular, how it might be distinguished from
guilt. In ordinary speech, these two terms are often used interchangeably. For example, one might say, "I feel so ashamed" in the
same way that one might say, "I feel so guilty about what I did."
For the purposes of this Article, I am not interested in "correcting"

98. See Richard NV. Harding, PrivatePrisons,in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PuNISHMENr
626, 626 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998).
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.; JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DEcISION: PUBLic ENDS, PRIVATE
MEANs 215 (1989).
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ordinary language. Rather, I want to distinguish these two emotional phenomena solely for the purpose of describing what I mean
102
by shaming punishments and guilt punishments.
To that end, I want to begin by focusing chiefly on what I
think of as the public dimension of shame and the private dimension of guilt. Consider shame. It has been said that shame "is the
emotion that a person experiences when she believes that she has
been disgraced in the eyes of persons whom she respects." 10 3 It is a
result of a ceremony or action whose meaning of disapproval can be
understood both by the offender and the members of the community.10 4 Think again of the types of shaming punishments described
in Part I. They are marked by two features: first, there is an attempt to debase, degrade, or humiliate the offender; and second, the
degradation occurs before the public eye, often but not always with
the aid of the public.
As Kahan has pointed out, these penalties may be no crueler
than the hardships of prison, which often have elements of humiliation bound up in the daily experience of being a prisoner. 10 5 But
unlike incarceration, shaming punishments aim at the degradation
of another human being. Moreover, shaming punishments "deal
with the public, with society at large, with the crowd," in a way
very different than incarceration does. Whitman, for example, notes
that shaming punishments risk instituting "an official lynch justice."10 6 In contrast, guilt punishments do not require this public
dimension at all.
Consider two other distinctions that have been drawn between shame and guilt:
First, guilt is local; shame is global. Shame represents a judgment about one's

worth as a person. In shame's eyes, therefore, the entire self stands condemned. In
contrast, guilt distinguishes between the wrongdoer and the wrong, condemning
the sin but not the sinner. Second .... because shame is total, it engulfs the true
self and leaves it with no reason and no leverage to make amends. The shamed self
can only hide or, when pressed against the wall, strike back. In contrast, because

102. Because this discussion of the distinction between shame and guilt is for such a narrow
purpose, I would urge readers interested in a more lengthy discussion, with greater reference to
the psychological literature, to read MARTHA NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST,

SHAME AND THE LAW (forthcoming 2002) and Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implica.
tions for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 645 (1997).
103. Kahan, supranote 2, at 636.
104. Id. at 637.

105. See id. 646; see also TED CONOVER, NEIVJACK (2000) (describing prisoner humiliation in
one New York prison).
106. See Whitman, supranote 21, at 1059.
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guilt focuses on the wrong, it leaves the wrongdoer with the room as well as the
motivation he or she needs to make amends and right the wrong. 10

So for the purpose of this Article, I distinguish shame and
guilt in the following, and admittedly, crude manner: shame is the
emotion one feels when subjected to public degradation, whereas
guilt is the emotion one feels after consciously becoming aware of
wrongdoing over which one feels responsiblelOS Thus, I may feel
guilt after successfully murdering my ex-lover despite the fact that
no one suspects me of anything evil. By contrast, I may feel shame
when my parents and my friends discover the unseemly fact of my
wrongdoing and, for example, denigrate me before the view of others. Relatedly, I may feel shame after being publicly humiliated
even though I did nothing wrong. 10 9 In that situation, I would not
feel guilty.
There is an active dimension to this (artificial) distinction
that I also wish to emphasize. When one shames another person,
the goal is to degrade the object of shame, to place him lower in the
chain of being, to dehumanize him. Kahan and Posner, as mentioned earlier, talk about destroying the reputation of the offender.
But when one "guilts" another person, one (implicitly) appeals to
ideals of reciprocity, decency, solidarity; one expresses sadness that
the other defected from the agreement or the "team," as it were.
Underlying the "guilting" activity is a hope of reconnection and a
sadness from the original tear in the social fabric." 0
B. Why People Think Shaming PunishmentsAre Beautifully
Retributive
To provide background, I show in this section that both the
critics and proponents of shaming punishments have identified a
close affinity between the use of shaming punishments and the retributivist justification for punishment. My challenge later is to
demonstrate why retribution, when properly understood, is actually
hostile toward shaming punishments.

107. See Garvey, supranote 1, at 1812.
108. On this understanding, guilt is not to be viewed as a status or state of being, as in the
phrase: "guilty of a crime." See generally P.F. STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND RESFNTMEN"r AND

OTHER ESSAYS 1, 4-6 (1974).
109. But see discussion supra note 22 (regarding shame and humiliation).
110. For this reason, one might think reintegrative shaming ceremonies, as advocated by
Braithwaite, blur the line between shaming and guilting someone. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE.
CRIME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION (1989); see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 102.
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About a decade ago, Dean Toni Massaro wrote an article that
questioned the effectiveness of shaming punishments."' According
to Massaro, American communities lacked the "level of interdependence, strong norm cohesion, and robust communitarianism"
that would make shaming effective. 112 Because of these demographic problems, Massaro concluded that "public shaming by a
criminal court judge will be, at most, a retributive spectacle that is
devoid of other positive community-expressive or communityreinforcing content. 113 Thus, although Massaro acknowledged that
any of the four traditional ends of punishment--deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution--could be satisfied by the
use of shaming punishments, 114 she argued that America's current
cultural situation renders shaming punishments wholly undesirable.
The interesting question for us is: How did Massaro find that
retributivism could permit a shaming punishment, and indeed endorse it? It is important to focus on her argument in particular, because two Yale Law School professors who followed her
path-Kahan and Whitman-seem to have been persuaded by Massaro's characterization. 1 5 Massaro begins by defining four elements
of retributivism. First, "retributivists" argue that punishment is
justified to "counteract" the "harm inflicted by the wrongdoer" because the wrongdoer "deserves it.116 Second, " 'an eye for an eye' is
proper redress for a crime, in order to set right the moral balance."' 7 Third, "retributive justice is nonconsequentialist in that it
is uninterested in influencing the offender's future behavior or the

111. See Massaro, supranote 21; see also Massaro, supra note 102.
112. Massaro, supra note 21, at 1883. Specifically, she argued that only the presence of five
factors would enable the effective use of shaming sanctions: offenders must be members of a
distinct group, such "as a close-knit religious or ethnic community"; the sanction must negatively
affect the social standing of the offender within the group; the "shaming must be communicated
to the group and the group must withdraw from the offender-shun her-physically, emotionally, financially, or otherwise"; the offender must wish to avoid withdrawal from the group; and
finally, there must be "some means of regaining community esteem, unless the misdeed is so
grave that the offender must be permanently exiled or demoted." Id.
113. Id. at 1884 (emphasis added).
114. See id. at 1891 ('Iconclude that as a theoretical matter, shaming may be justifiable under any of the classical theories of punishment.").
115. See Kahan, supra note 2, at 630-41 (citing Massaro's account of retributivism); Whitman, supra note 21, at 1059.
116. Massaro, supra note 21, at 1891.
117. Id.
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behavior of other community members."u 8 Fourth, retributivism
ccpresupposes free will by the criminal actor.""19
The attraction of retributivism, according to Massaro, is that
it "satisfies deep emotional, intuitive instincts. Moreover, its ends
are simply stated and fairly easy to secure. We punish in order to
avenge the harm, not to deter, rehabilitate, or contain. Revenge is
easier to accomplish than these other objectives." 120 She continues:
"Of course, pure retributivism, and thus any retributivist-based attempt to justify [shaming] signs, rests on fairly shallow reasoning,
namely, that the law has to punish crime, however it can. Major
objections to pure retributivism, which apply equally to retributivist justifications for shaming, are that it does not prevent the
2
abuses of unequal, disproportional, or inhumane punishment."' '
Massaro concludes her discussion of retributivism by speculating
whether "wearing a sign or apologizing would. . . satisfy the community's interest in revenge."'122 She hypothesizes that it might, but
she doubts that shaming punishments would sufficiently express
"community outrage" in various communities.123
Although I think this part of Massaro's account of retributivism is flawed, the reasons why will not become clear until later in
this Article. 124 At this point, it is important to note simply that
Massaro argues that retributivism is fully compatible with shaming
sanctions.
Dan Kahan's treatment of retributivism and shame is more
nuanced, but he sees the same friendliness between retribution and
shame. He identifies the "core idea of retributivism" as the idea
"that an individual should be punished 'because, and only because,

118. Id.
119. Id. One observes that, thus far, there is a rough resemblance between this characterization and the strong thesis of retribution discussed earlier in the Introduction.
120. Id. at 1892. Note how Massaro is conflating revenge and retribution, which is analogous
to what I later will call the socially denunciative and the confrontational relationships.
121. Id. at 1893.
122. Id. Strictly speaking, a coerced apology is quite different from wearing a sign, and poses
its own problems for a liberal regime, since it contravenes free speech principles, which include
the right not to speak.
123. Id.
124. The relevant sections are Parts III and IV.A. I should say this, however, there are obviously many different ways of describing what retribution is, and what theorists of retribution

have to say about it. A person could say X, Y, and Z are what she means by retribution and decide not to include P and Q. Although there is some value to such a stipulative definition, it risks
confusing others who think retribution really includes P and Q. My view is that Massaro's account of retribution is really about revenge, and thus rests on a conceptually confused foundation. Once we understand why retribution is distinct from revenge, and once retribution is rendered as an intelligible practice with its own internal goods, retribution no longer would look as
shallow or ugly as it does in the account offered by Massaro.
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To give more content to this notion, he draws

on Jean Hampton's work, contending that "the proper retribution is
the one that appropriately expresses condemnation and reaffirms
the values that the wrongdoer denies." 126 From this statement and
his generally warm embrace of shaming punishments, we are to
infer that shaming punishments are indeed compatible with, if not
endorsed by, retributivism. Near the end of his article, Kahan defends shaming punishments against a barrage of criticisms-namely, that shaming punishments offend notions of equality and dignity and that they are not effective as deterrents-and
he apparently thinks he has addressed the most significant challenges that a retributivist might offer. 127 In fact, though, Kahan
never fully considers what problems might inhere in a linkage between retributivism and shaming punishments.
Professor James Whitman also subscribes to Massaro's account, and thus identifies the same (mistaken) compatibility between retributivism and shaming punishments. 28 Indeed he characterizes shaming punishments as "beautifully retributive." 129 This
acceptance of Massaro's stance is unfortunate because had Whitman examined retributivism more closely, he would not have concluded that the liberal tradition is unable to "reveal why shame
sanctions are wrong." 130 This is because liberalism and retribution
131
trade on many of the same constitutive ideals.
Why might it be that scholars such as Massaro, Kahan, and
Whitman thought that shaming punishments could be justified
from a retributive point of view? One potential explanation is historical. 132 In the debate about the justification of criminal punishment, there has, at least for the past couple of generations and
maybe for a good deal longer, been only one moralizing position:

125. Kahan, supra note 2, at 602 (quoting Michael Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179

(Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987)).
126. Id.
127. See id. at 649; Whitman, supra note 21, at 1062 (interpreting Kahan as indicating compatibility between shaming punishments and retributivism).
128. Whitman, supra note 21, at 1062.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1063.
131. Part IV of this Article illustrates precisely how the liberal tradition can reveal the in.
compatibility of shaming punishments with a liberal political order. I will not make the bolder
claims, however, that if one is a retributivist, one must be a liberal, or if one is a liberal, one
must be a retributivist. I do think there is a deep affinity, but it is not my project to show either
of these relationships to be necessary ones.
132. This, at least, was the suggestion made to me by Bill Stuntz.
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retributivism. Utilitarians might think in deterrence terms or they
might be more pro-rehabilitation. 133 But for moralists, retribution
was the only partner at the dance. And what is more, shaming looks
thoroughly moralistic. As will become clear as the argument unfolds, looks are deceiving; however, given this intellectual history it
may seem almost natural to link shaming to retribution.
Of course, there are arguments that would defend shaming
punishments on other grounds, such as standard fare utilitarianism
accounts that emphasize some net economic benefit accruing from
their use. In essence, these are the arguments of Book, Kahan, and
Posner. 134 Although I think these kinds of utilitarian arguments are
incomplete--they often take a short-sighted view in assessing the
long-term net social benefits-my goal is to focus on explaining the
incompatibility between shaming and retribution.
One might wonder, finally, why it is significant to clarify this
relationship between retribution and shame. After all, neither the
opponents of shaming such as Massaro and Whitman, nor the proponents of shaming, such as Kahan and Posner, self-identify as retributivists. One reason this clarification is important is to encourage greater caution in the use of our conceptual classifications. But
equally important is the task of providing grounds to help shift the
rhetorical and political coalitions that might stand in favor or
against shaming punishments. Achieving those tasks can now begin.
III. THE CONFRONTATIONAL CONCEPTION OF RETRIBUTION

In this part, I sketch the contours of what I call the Confrontational Conception of Retribution (CCR).135 The goal here is to provide an account of retribution that not only justifies but also obligates (in a prima facie sense) organized political responses to legal
136
wrongdoing.

133. Obviously, utilitarians think the course that maximizes the most utility is the moral
choice. So when I use "moralist" or "moralizing," I am referring to the scolding sensibility of the
schoolteacher, the kind of person who punishes, and enjoys punishing, as a result of what Nietzche called "ressentiment."
134. See Book, supra note 21; Kahan, supra note 2; Kahan & Posner, supra note 18. Bear in

mind that in his recent book, Posner has retreated from a full embrace of shaming punishments.
See POSNER, supranote 74, at 88-106.
135. This part draws upon but revises and extends further my previous work on retributivism. See Markel, supra note 11, at 421-42.
136. The reader should observe from this sentence in the text that I am not interested in defending retributive justice in some prepolitical noninstitutional way as some do. See GEORGE
SHER, DESERT 69-90 (1987).

2184

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 54:2157

A. Three Relations
To begin, I want to discuss three oddly named relations that
need to be addressed in the context of punishment: the confrontational relation, the social denunciativist relation, and the common
good relation. Understanding these three relations is a helpful heuristic to understand the claim that retribution is internally intelligible and attractive as a social practice.
1. The Confrontational Relation
The first relationship, the most straightforward, is what I
call the confrontational relationship between the offender and the
state, specifically the state's institutions of investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and punishment. This confrontational relationship results from the legal wrongdoing of the offender and some
knowledge of that wrongdoing by the state. 137 The relationship presupposes an extant legal order that issues laws worthy of an obligation to obey.138 When these two elements are present, the relationship ideally results in an encounter between the state and the offender, an encounter or confrontation that may or may not include
punishment as traditionally understood. The dimensions and duration of the encounter are stipulated by law, though the law will not
insist on only one kind of encounter. For example, if during the encounter the offender is deemed incompetent, then one might rea-

137. Must the state have certainty of legal wrongdoing? Before the determination of culpabil.
ity, the state has no certain way of knowing, so the standard ought to be something like a good.
faith basis for thinking a guilty conviction could be attained from a reasonable factfinder.
138. In other words, the topic of what ought to trigger criminal legislation is not at issue.
There is no necessary tension between a commitment to retributivism and a positive conception
of legal obligation, which ex ante, one has good reason to obey as a prima facie matter. Doubtless,
a decent retributivist would feel moral outrage at the notion of prosecuting a couple for miscege.
nation or for some other stupid "crime," but that moral outrage stems from commitments and
reasons extraneous to her retributivism. A person's commitment to retributivism would be balanced against her commitments to other principles of practical reason. Otherwise she would be
unreasonably fetishizing one set of commitments over equally or more compelling commitments.
Of course, despite the separateness of the questions of (a) what should be the object of criminal
legislation and (b) what justifies punishment, there are some retributivists who have suggested
lines of inquiry for answering the first question. See, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L.
COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 130-37 (2d ed. 1990);
Jean Hampton, CorrectingHarms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1659 (1992).
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sonably expect that the encounter is not identical to those encounters when a offender is deemed competent. 139
During the encounter, the state attempts to learn more
about the wrongdoing of the offender and the reasons for the
wrongdoing. Once the state has sufficient knowledge of a given
situation, it responds in a way commensurate with the knowledge of
the situation. 140 Hence, if the state can make no adequate determination, it dismisses the matter and ends the relationship. On the
other hand, if a certain threshold of knowledge is passed, the state
has a range of options from which it can choose to communicate to
the offender the unacceptable nature of the wrongdoing. 141 At this
stage, assuming there aren't any sufficient excuses for the wrongdoing, it is crucial that the state use its power to respond in a way
that signifies the denial of the offender's claim to, among other
things, greater liberty than his fellow citizens and, if relevant, his
victim. 142 The law realizes, through its range of responses, that the

139. See generally Carol S. Steiker, Punishmentand Procedure:Punishment Theory and the
Criminal-CivilProceduralDivide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775 (1997).
140. The state is obligated in a prima facie sense to pursue the encounter, and to make a
good-faith effort to do so. This does not forbid imposing statutes of limitations or manpower caps
on investigation or adjudication. Rather, the extent of the obligation will have to be decided
through the institutions of our complex and pluralistic democratic society. It is what Aquinas
would call a matter of "determinatio y That is, it is an area that is not dictated by a priori reason.
but through consideration of practical alternatives and reasoned consideration of a variety of
interests. These rules, which cover a "vast area!' for legislative creativity, are "to some extent
guided by the circumstances of a particular society, and to some extent, 'arbitrary.' " FINNIS,
supranote 31, at 286.
141. Unfortunately, there are cases in the United States permitting the state to remain vllfully passive in the face of knowledge about legal wrongdoing. See Wayte v. United States, 470
U.S. 598, 607-14 (1985). In Wayte, the government had a passive enforcement policy, meaning
that it would enforce the law only against those who refused to comply with the government's
draft-selection procedure, and only after the government "begged" them to comply and they refused. The government ended up prosecuting about 16 of some 674,000 persons that failed to
register. Although the government had databases that could easily list who had been noncompliant, the government's policy was vindicated by the courts as a matter of prosecutorial discretion.
This case provides a good example of the complex relationship between social cost and retribution. To prosecute all the noncompliant offenders under the extant law would require the state to
hire a new army of prosecutors and to build a new city of prisons. The effect of this might be so
overwhelming as to spur the legislators to reconsider what should really be sanctioned through
the criminal law. It is because of potentially devastating social costs that theorists of punishment
must be prepared to situate matters of criminal legislation and sentencing in the ex ante position, where one adopts an "idealized observer" status in which one chooses a policy based on all
available information and perspectives except for the identity one would have later on. I discuss
this at greater length in a book-length project, tentatively entitled, RethinhingRetribution.
142. The claim to greater liberty may seem odd, but my basic point here relies on the familiar
first principle of JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1999), namely that society be structured in a way as to provide the greatest amount of liberty that would be consonant for all to
have in equal amounts. The criminal's act is a claim to greater liberty because by its nature, the
criminal act is a rejection of the rule that limited everyone else's liberty.
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denial of this claim can be conveyed in a host of ways and that some
ways are more appropriate than others. The purpose of those responses, however, is essentially the same: to affirm the moral responsibility of the offender and to diminish the plausibility of any
offender's claim to usurp power from the state or to possess superiority over his fellow citizens. 43 Coercing the offender to undergo
some form of deprivation, it should be noted, serves as evidence of
the denial of these claims. But not all retributive responses need to
be punitive in the same manner.144

2. The Socially Denunciative Relation
Consider now a second relationship, one I call the socially
denunciative perspective. In this relationship, not just the offender
and the state appear, but also the particular victim (if there is one)
and those individuals or groups sympathetic to the victim within
society. The practice of punishment here, according to Emile Durkheim, is to serve as a "sign indicating the sentiments of the collectivity."' 45 The English jurist, James Fitzjames Stephen, articulated

a similar position: "[Criminal] law gives definite expression and a
solemn ratification

. . .

to the hatred which is excited by the com-

mission of the offence . ...
146 Punishment's relation to crime, says
Stephen, stands "to the one set of passions in the same relation in
which marriage stands to the [sexual passions].' 47 Stated along
these narrow dimensions, there is a great overlap between the confrontational and socially denunciative relations.
Social denunciation takes on a new meaning, however, when
this expressivist view is taken to mean that these signs of senti-

143. This brief explanation is developed in Part III.C and is manifestly indebted to Joan
Hampton's work. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 131

(1988). Hampton's account, however, does not sufficiently explain the state's interest in retribution because her account is chiefly victim centered. The version in the text addresses this, hero
and in Part III.C.
144. This claim is what permits consideration of alternative sanctions, and it constitutes a
departure from Kantian accounts.
145. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 63 (W.D. Halls trans., 1984).
146. 2 JAMES FIT-zJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81 (London, MacMillan 1883). Dan Kahan observes that Durkheim and Stephen, as well as Joel
Feinberg, Robert Nozick and Jean Hampton, all serve as intellectual authority for the expressive
dimension of punishment. See Kahan, supra note 2, at 594-95. This is a correct observation, as
all the above-mentioned figures do view punishment as an expressive act that repudiates false
values. But it is a mistake to think that all of these thinkers would endorse an expressive dimension of punishment that includes the expressions that occur in the use of shaming punishments.
Some of the thinkers might, others might not.
147. 2 STEPHEN, supra note 146, at 82.
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ments are for the purpose of ventilation or reconciliation. This is
where we begin to see the roots of the confusion in Massaro, Kahan,
and Whitman's accounts, all of which identify a connection between
retribution and shaming punishments. To see this confusion with
greater clarity, it is important to separate two elements that inhere
in the socially denunciative view. The first element, which is shared
by the confrontational relation, communicates moral condemnation
of the offender's act. The second element is that this condemnation
occurs for two purposes: the satisfaction of the public's desire to see
justice done and, more basely, the exercise of its hatred or rage at
the offense and, sometimes, the offender. In modern parlance, this
latter idea gets translated as a belief that "judges [should be] adding humiliation to the mix to soothe a public hungry" for punishment. 148 This discourse is no different than that used by Lord Devlin to justify use of the criminal law to enforce society's moral
evaluations on matters that scarcely cause harm or suffering to

others. 149
Let me say a point about the first purpose-the desire to see
justice done. There is nothing wrong with (and indeed something
quite good about) the public having knowledge of the confrontation
between the state and criminals. When the public witnesses the
state repudiate a offender's claim to greater liberty, such a claim is
more obviously denied. The public belief that punishment for
wrongdoing occurs helps form the mucilage that keeps society together. For that reason, courtrooms open to public viewing, jury
trials, and other social practices that permit transparency in the
administration of justice have their benefits.
But the socially denunciative position has a second purpose,
the satisfaction of seeing the offender suffer. I want to suggest that
this second purpose goes to the heart of the social denunciativist
view because without public condemnation of the offender, there
would be no reconciliation between the victim's family and the state
or between the group to which that victim belonged and the group
to which the offender belonged 5 0 This second purpose is the essence of the socially denunciative relationship: even though the exponents of this view of punishment appear to be retributivists,

148. Haya El Nasser, Payingfor Crime with Shame, USA TODAY, June 25. 1996, at 1A (referring to the assessment by various legal scholars).
149. See SIR PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 66-82 (1959). H.L" Hart
characterized Lord Devlin's view that punishment may be used for "venting" as "uncomfortably
close to human sacrifice as an expression of religious worship." H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND
MORALITY 65-66 (1963).

150. This might be the case with respect to hate crimes, for example.
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seeking "just justice," their real interests appear to be more of the
expressive than retributive sort.15 1 Is this an important distinction?
Obviously, one can hold a mixed position, and say that both
moral condemnation and public expression of that condemnation
should attach to all punishments. 152 But it is worth isolating the
idea that social denunciativists seek the condemnation of the offender in a public way. They want to know that punishment is occurring, and they want to know that others know it as well. If they
do not know of the condemnation and subsequent pain or privation
visited upon the criminal, then the confrontation between the state
and the criminal has no value to them.
What then is it about this convention of visibly administered
incarceration that appeals to social denunciativists? It is the same
thing that made public whippings or beheadings desirable, or at
least bearable, two hundred years ago-a desire to respond adequately to our emotional sense of not just anger but disgust at what
was done. 153 As Kahan writes, "[N]o other moral sentiment can reproduce the work that disgust does in voicing our opposition to
moral atrocities."' 154 Punishments that impose a more visible hardship properly manifest social disgust with what was done. 1 5 To be
sure, disgust has its moral limits: it can reinforce unjust hierarchies, it can lead to disproportionate reactions, and it can work
against individual autonomy. 156 But for the social denunciativists,
the better society is one that expresses disgust effectively, if not
unequivocally, by publicly condemning not only violations of law,
but also the violators of law.
For Kahan and other supporters of shaming punishments,
the reason a shaming punishment is a preferable punishment to
community service or a fine is that it seems capable of channeling
disgust appropriately. As one commentator puts it, a shaming punishment "sets an example for others and provides the public with a
tangible sense of justice in action." 57 Here justice in action appears
to be a short way of saying that this offender is getting his face

151. The view of "just justice" was articulated in street signs and legal challenges to the

South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), where protesters expressed their
antipathy to the particularized amnesty regime.

152. Indeed, there is a way to capture this mixed position in a more attractive manner. See
infra text accompanying note 272.
153. Kahan, supra note 26, at 1656.
154. Id. at 1657.
155. Kahan, supra note 2, at 591.
156. See WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST 2-9 (1997).
157. Book, supranote 21, at 653.

2001]

SHAMING PUNISHMNTS

2189

rubbed in the mess he made and that having this done in public will
mollify the bloodlust of the multitudes. 1 8
One might surmise that the retributive, or confrontational,
relationship is also expressively condemnatory, since the state in its
response is effectively saying, "You, the criminal, were wrong to
have transgressed the law." But the retributive relationship is different because it is less interested in expressing condemnation to
the world and more interested in communicating the message of
opprobrium to the offender. To borrow from C.S. Lewis, retribution
"plants the flag of truth within the fortress of a rebel soul."15 9 Thus,

retributivism does not require, though it permits and endorses, the
public aspect of this expression in certain forms. For the social denunciativists, on the other hand, public expression of the denunciation is crucial because in its absence punishment would not achieve
the desired reconciliation (or peace of mind) between the victim's
family and the criminal or the survivor's family and society more
generally. 160 What matters for the social denunciativists is the social satisfaction derived from the state's response. 16 1
Two problematic implications arise from a theory of social
denunciativism unmoored to a theory of confrontational retributivism. First, to the extent that the social denunciativists believe reconciliation or peace of mind cannot occur without public expression
condemning the wrongdoers, a significant question emerges regarding whether it even matters who the wrongdoer is. As long as the
survivor (or society) gets to see a plausible story of punishment enacted, in which some "offender" is made to suffer, then the purpose
behind the social denunciativist's ideology-to express moral outrage at the wrongdoing experienced by the victim and society-is

158. Cf. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS pt. II (Valter Kaufmann &
R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1989) (castigating the ressentiment motivating the priestly castes joy in
punishing).
159. C.S. LEwis, THE PROBLEM OF PAIN 95 (1944).
160. The political appeal of this concern is suggested by the bipartisan support of a victims'
rights amendment to the American Constitution. For example, both major candidates in the 2000
presidential race supported a crime victims' constitutional amendment.
161. It bears mentioning that expressivist understandings of punishment can be unpacked in
different ways. At one extreme, one can try to justify punishment merely by the state's communicative response to the offender. For others, there is no utility derived unless there is publicity of
the state's response. And for others, one might justify punishment from a hypothetically possible
satisfaction of expression ("We punish because, under ideal conditions, punishment satisfies the
public need to express rage at crime."); or we might point to actual satisfaction as the justifying
feature of punishment ("Each criminal should be punished because that way the public will be
satisfied."); or we might point to the actual satisfaction as the aim of punishment (%Ve punish in
order to satisfy public rage."), either in particular instances or in the practice and method of
punishment in society at a given time.
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satisfied. 162 In other words, noble lies possessing the appearance of
narrative integrity, akin to those described by Socrates in Plato's
Republic,163 may acceptably be told to ease the suffering of the vic164
tims, survivors, and groups sympathetic to their plight.
This narrative of pain connects up with the way in which
some might conceive someone's "taste for fairness." If the goal is
only to satisfy subjective tastes and preferences, the Benthamite
utilitarian would prefer to satisfy this taste with cheap(er) substitutes when possible, assuming the other consequences (deterrence,
denying need for revenge outside the law) remain constant. But
characterizing a taste for fair punishment as a taste fails to capture
the expressive meaning that punishment may signify. 165 Thinking
of this preference merely as a thirst to be quenched fails to capture
the richer sense in which one thinks punishment for legal wrongdoing is worthwhile. This problem is similar to the classic critique
Hart had of Austin's characterization of law as a threat-based set of
commands: it distorts the nature of obligation through its reduc66

tionism. 1

A second problem relates to the matter of prediction or,
rather, the lack of certainty of desired outcomes. Will the public
condemnation actually achieve the reconciliation desired? Will it
actually afford the psychic comfort sought by those seeking the punishment? To the extent that certain losses and grief are incompensable

and

inconsolable, 167 it

is

uncertain-even

improb-

able-that the suffering of another will serve as the balm to the
perturbed mind that James Fitzjames Stephen posited. 168 This is

162. 2 STEPHEN, supra note 146, at 82 (contending that the execution of criminal justice
stands "to the one set of passions in the same relation in which marriage stands to the [sexual
passions]").
163. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, at III.415a-d (Allan Bloom trans., Harper Collins, 2d ed.
1991).

164. Some practical limits inhere: the strategy of framing the wrong person will not work if
the real offender continues to commit similar crimes and uses the same modus operandi.
165. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503, 1504 (2000); Dan M. Kahan & Martha Nussbaum, Two
Conceptions of Emotion in CriminalLow, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 352 (1996).
166. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 26-49 (2d ed. 1994).
167. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENTS 282 (2000) (observing that in most situations compensation never compensates).
168. For instance, many members of victims' groups such as Parents of Murdered Childron
are banding together to express their opposition to the death penalty. One website reports that
victims' families often feel that
no sentence can ever "equate to the loss of your child's life and the horrors of

murder." Frequently, victims' families recognize that the death penalty will inflict the same pain they have felt on the accused's family. As one mother replied
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not to say other desirable outcomes might not occur: greater deterrence is one possible outcome that might arise even if reconciliation
does not. But it is important to recognize that the same difficulty of
prediction will affect, and thus render problematic, policy choices
that rely exclusively on uncertain consequences.
3. The Common Good Relation
In addition to theories of penal encounter centering on retribution and social denunciation, I briefly want to call attention to a
third relationship. This relationship involves the moral ecology that
connects the web of interests, reasons, preferences, and values that
prevail in any given society. This third relationship appears nebulous because it is so all-encompassing, but the idea of "common
good" begins to capture the point. What might be the common good?
One possible definition is the "set of conditions which enables the
members of a community to attain for themselves reasonable objectives, or to realize reasonably for themselves the value(s) for the
sake of which they have reason to collaborate . . . in a community." 169 This relationship encompasses the variety of communities
and individuals who participate in a complex scheme of social cooperation among free and equal citizens. All legal and political institutions must respect this third relationship, and all the groups and
individuals in this relationship must peacefully coexist for the state
to rule effectively and fairly. I will call this the common good relationship. It is this relationship that is considered when we situate
the project of retributive justice ex ante, that is, as one practice
among many attractive practices within a good and decent society. I
say a bit more about the demands this relation may make upon the
confrontational relation at the end of this part.
With a rough understanding of these three relationships, we
can now try to address how the competing goals of the second and
third relationships can be mediated by a proper understanding of
the first relationship, the confrontational relationship between offender and state.

when asked at the funeral of her murdered son if she wanted the death penalty:
"No, there's been enough killing."

Religious
Action
Center of Reform Judaism,
Issues:
http:/rj.orgrac/issues/issuedp.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2001).
169. FINNIS, supra note 31, at 155.

Death

Penalty,

at
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B. The InternalJustificationand Prima Facie Obligation of
Retribution
Understanding the differences among the three relations described above is only the first step in trying to understand the CCR.
This section performs the next step. Here I wish to explain what I
mean by the CCR and show why the practice of retribution is both
justifiable (regardless of contingent social benefits) and obligatory
in a prima facie sense. 170 Punishment requires justification because
its potential modes of corporeal violence, insults to one's dignity or
reputation, and restrictions on an individual's liberty are all otherwise illegitimate social practices in the context of a well-ordered
society. Indeed, the understanding is that it is better for a society to
have less punishment rather than more, because punishment is
only merited for legal offenses, of which we should prefer fewer. 171
Various justifications are offered for state punishment. In a
passage from Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals, a well-known catalogue of the utilities of punishment appears. Through its various
forms, Nietzsche writes, punishment renders a person harmless; it
prevents further harm generally; it provides recompense to the injured party for the harm done; it isolates a disturbance of equilibrium, so as to guard against any further spread of the disturbance;
it inspires fear of those who determine and execute the punishment;
it is a kind of repayment for the advantages the criminal has enjoyed hitherto; it expels a degenerate element; it serves as a festival, namely as the rape and mockery of a finally defeated enemy; it
makes the memory, whether for him who suffers the punishment,
or for those who witness its execution; it pays a fee stipulated by
the sovereign power that protects the wrongdoer from the excesses
of revenge; and it is a compromise with revenge when revenge is
claimed as a privilege by powerful clans; it awakens the feeling of
guilt in the guilty person. 172
The list, Nietzsche writes, is overdetermined by utilities of
all kinds. '71 3 But of these many utilities, only some of them occur in

170. Prima facie duties cannot be denied as obligations, but the determination of how and
when to discharge those obligations is a prudential matter and these obligations may be set asido
when other duties supervene.
171. Cf. H.J. McCloskey, The Complexity of the Concepts of Punishment, 37 PHIL. 307, 323
(1962) ("Punishment differs from quarantining, social surgery, etc., in that with these the evil is

not an essential, deliberately intended part of the activity, in that if the evil could miraculously
be avoided, the quarantining and social surgery would remain.").
172. NIETZSCHE, supra note 158, at 80-81.
173. Id. at 81.

2001]

SHAMING PUNISRVENTS

2193

a noncontingent manner. Those utilities I call internal utilities, because their goods are realized inside the practice; they do not require or depend upon future consequences to have their good realized. Thus, the fact that punishment may curb potentially limitless
and disproportionate private revenge, that it deters future crimes,
that it provides social self-defense, and that it offers rehabilitative
opportunities-all these are potentially powerful justifications, but
174
they are external to the practice and therefore contingent.
By pointing to internal goods, the theory of punishment I
endorse commends retribution independent of the external social
ends it might serve, that is, as worthwhile in itself.17 5 (This is not
the same as indifference to the consequences and costs of punishment.) Can retribution for legal wrongdoing be defended without
concern for the external consequences it may bring about, such that
"punishment for immorality would exemplify justice or [have] worth
"176 I
not merely in our familiar world, but in any possible world?
think it is possible if it can be shown that punishment for legal
wrongdoing itself does something good and that the good it achieves
is not outweighed by some other course of action. 1 "7The theory I
offer contends just this: that retribution for unlawful wrongdoing is
internally justifiable because it is achieves certain goods. Although
others have endorsed retribution by appealing to the intuition that
8 few have exthe just deserts of an offender requires punishment, 17
plained what it is about "just deserts" that makes it valuable. I try

174. Among the better-known early formulations of these justifications are those of Cesare
Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham. See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHIENT AND OTHER

WRITINGS (Richard Bellamy ed. & Richard Davies trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1764);
JEREMy BENTHAh, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H.

Burns & HIL.A. Hart eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1970).
175. Of course, this internal character does not in and of itself make it a better theory ofpunishment than one motivated by the pursuit of external ends. The point here at least is to show
that there are ideals that are effectuated by a retributive understanding of punishment; one's
commitment to these ideals may legitimately guide punishment even if the external ends could
not be achieved. It should be said that just because some good is achieved by retribution does not
mean that under certain extreme circumstances there might not be warrant for the suspension of
retributive practices.
176. See Gertrude Ezorsky, Introduction to PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PuNISiHMENr,
at xi, xvii-xix (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972).
177. Where I wrote "good," others might say "inherently right." See, eg., MICHAEL S. MOORE,
The Argument for Retributivism, in LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 238,
238-43 (1984) (relying on the "inherent rightness of the practice" of giving an offender his just
deserts as the basis for a formal syllogistic defeat of utilitarian theories). I prefer "good7 because
saying a practice is inherently right stops the conversation. It requires us to accept that characterization as intelligible without asking what might make it a good reason for action against all
other actions.
178. See, e.g., M. Thornton, Against Retributiuism, in RETRIBUTVISM AND ITS CRITICS 83
(Wesley Cragg ed., 1992).
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to do this in what follows. But to say retribution is good in itself,
however, does not render it a prima facie obligation-that too needs
to be shown. For, as I have suggested earlier, not all goods can be
pursued when the call of other goods (such as avoiding war or famine) supervenes with urgency.
Let me begin with a brief encapsulation of what the CCR
looks like. The bare claim is that states are justified and (defeasibly) obligated to respond to legal wrongdoing in a manner shaped
by law when that response is administered by (an agent of) the
state to the person who deserves such a response because of his legal wrongdoing. 179 The justifications for this cluster of claims are
what we turn to now.
The argument functions on several levels. First, retribution
for legal wrongdoing is justified in part because it affirms the dignity of the offender by treating him as a responsible moral agent. 180
How? When the state addresses a person's unlawful wrongdoing,
her moral agency is affirmed because she can express remorse, recognize her wrongdoing, and make efforts to avoid that conduct in
the future. Or, in the alternative, she may give reasons that the
conduct was not harmful or wrongful, or that though her conduct
was harmful, it was excusable under the circumstances. 181 A cognitive process is involved in retribution that possesses moral
weight.182 This weightiness is highlighted by dialectical consideration of the alternative. Imagine that the state knew about someone's legal wrongdoing but refused to address it. Not only does this
inaction indicate a fundamental disrespect for the victim (your interests and values are not those we deem important) 83 but also for
the offender (we will not condescend to treat your actions seriously).

179. One might fairly ask whether, on this characterization, parents "punish" their children.
Words often mean different things in different contexts. For this Article's purpose, I would pro-

pose that we stipulate to the idea that punishment is but one form of penalty, a form over which
the state has a (proper) monopoly. So parents do not "punish" their children.
180. See HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 31 (1976).
181. See Von Hirsch, supra note 5, at 667.
182. Cf. Garvey, supra note 1, at 1805-10 (positing the ideal theory of punishment as one
that generates ideas of atonement in the mind of the offender of the wrong); Moore, supra note
125 (explaining the value of recognition and the opportunity of repentance).

183. This is not always the case though, so certain exceptions may apply. For example, when
a starving man steals a loaf of bread, the moral injury to the victim is not quite as great (as when
he steals out of mere convenience) since there is no intended insult to the owner as a person
deserving moral consideration and respect. Conversely, the decision to allocate more prosecute.
rial resources to violent crimes than nonviolent crimes may be justified because violence is a
more demeaning disrespect than most forms of theft or drug possession.
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As a result, when we punish a competent criminal, we instantiate
s4
the ideal of moral responsibility for one's actions.
By grounding retribution's worth upon the criminal's awareness of the state's desire to repudiate his illegitimate claims, we are
also able to give greater currency to the idea that punishment is a
communicative practice, not merely an expressive one.185 Thus, effective communication to the offender is of fundamental importance
to the practice of retribution. 186 The practice of retribution would
not be intelligible, for example, if the offender could not understand
the message that the state was sending. A thought experiment
fleshes out this view. Say the offender unwittingly swallowed an
amnesiac drug that erased his entire prior self-concept, or was massively lobotomized, such that he had no memory of the action, and
indeed no memory of his personality-would punishment make
sense in this context? On the retributivist view that I am develop-

ing, it would not. 187 (It would conversely be implausible to assert
that a failure to punish the insane would demoralize or render less
compliant mentally competent citizens.) 188

184. One cannot say that the affirmation of another's autonomy as a morally responsible
agent stops as soon as there has been a (correct) judgment of a court; it must continue throughout the retributive encounter. Cf. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, DIGNITY INPUNISHMIENT THE WIDENING
WESTERN DIVIDE (forthcoming) (offering as an instructive example the protection of dignity for
prisoners in contemporary Germany).
185. By this distinction, I mean that the state has an interest in communicating a particular
message to someone in particular; the expressivist has a larger audience in mind, and conceivably is indifferent to whether the expression reaches a particular person. For example, when I call
you at home to tell you Dad is not coming home tonight, that is a communication. When I write a
column in the newspaper, I am expressing my opinion. Communication, as I use it, has a known
and particularized target. This differs slightly from the definition used by others. Anderson and
Pildes, for example, say that expression requires only the manifestation of a mental state in
speech or action, whereas communication of a mental state requires "that one express it with the
intent that others recognize that state by recognizing that very communicative intention."
Anderson & Pildes, supra note 165, at 1508. Thus, a shoplifter may express her intention to get
away with pinching a purse but often she does not intend to communicate that intention. Id.
186. Unfortunately, the systemic defects of the procedures affecting criminal prosecution severely hinder the practice of effective communication to the offender. This is a topic I take up in
an ongoing project, The Promiseof ConstitutionalCriminal Procedure.
187. As a practical matter, this account suggests how the application of the death penalty to
retarded individuals is seriously misguided, on retributivist grounds at least.
188. That is not to say that no social action is warranted if we assessed the person as requiring therapy or some other form of treatment. But without some inquiry into, and evidence of, the
knowing malevolence of the offender's will, we would have to conclude that the imposition of
"punishmene' would lack intelligibility. (What about someone who intentionally lobotomizes
himself after the crime? You would punish him for the same reason you punish a person who
gets drunk or stoned and commits a crime.) Relatedly, the will of the offender is, to a degree,
made evident by his cooperation with the authorities both after his crime and during his period
of punishment, which explains why coming forward, offering a plea, or behaving well in prison
may justify reductions in a sentence handed down as retribution.
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If the first good achieved by retribution is the establishment
of a punitive discourse that communicates norms of moral agency,
the second good is that it upholds our commitment to treating individuals with equal concern and respect under the law. The premise
for this claim is that we are all equally burdened in our obligation
as citizens to obey the law. When someone flouts the law, he is actively choosing to untether himself from the common enterprise of
living peaceably together under a common law; he is defecting from
an agreement he would have made as a reasonable person in concert with other reasonable people. 8 9 By his act, the criminal is implicitly saying, "I have greater liberty than you, my fellow citizen."'190 He is cutting himself off for the purpose of imposing a new
order by his acts against people who should enjoy equal liberty as
guaranteed by the state's rule of law. 191
Retribution serves as the rejection of this claim and thus effectuates equal liberty. Metaphorically, it plants the flag of moral
truth in the rebel soul. When the state responds with retribution it
does not make the crime or harm disappear. It does, on the other
hand, diminish the evidence that might be proffered to a criminal's
claim of greater liberty: namely, an unanswered crime. 192 And the

189. I use the pronoun "he" simply because crime and punishment is dominated by males.
However, the larger justification for the theory that I offer should be attractive to both men and
women under ex ante conditions. Even though the account here may use "masculinist" language
at times, the account is intended as egalitarian in nature, viewing both genders as rights-bearing
moral agents who come together in concert to form unions of social cooperation that seek to so.
cure the conditions for human flourishing.
190. One infers the claim of greater liberty from the mens rea to violate the structural arrangement that one, as a reasonable and rational moral agent, has (or would have) chosen, not at
the contingent time that one may be required to remedy the breach.
191. One might think that this is hardly what goes on in the mind of most criminals. I do not
doubt that criminals are not articulating this as they pick a pocket or steal a car. Indeed, it is
true that there might be many maxims to be inferred from a criminal's behavior. But the question is whether there is plausible evidence to sustain one or several of these interpretations. And
part of what makes an interpretation of social fact a plausible one is that we decide to announce
that this is how we will interpret this kind of behavior prospectively. This interpretation is defensible, for when we affirm the moral agency of the offender through retribution, we recognize
that he himself might have acted for venal reasons, perhaps nothing quite so grand as political
rebellion or insult to fellow citizens. But by holding him accountable for his actions, we treat him
better than he was toward others, because we respect his capacity for moral decisionmaking. Of
course, there will be certain circumstances when it is fully implausible to infer these maxims
from a person's behavior and when those circumstances attach, retribution would not be sought,
or at least, not in the same way or to the same extent. This is what creates room for excuses,
justifications and mitigating circumstances, such as necessity, self-defense, and provocation.
192. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 143, at 131. Note that the discussion so far is
completely susceptible to a Nietzschean criticism: Why should one care about the criminal's
denial of the value of someone? Can we not just shrug our shoulders and move on? There is no
answer that can persuade the Nietzschean other than to state that "it is part of what it means to
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person who most needs to see that evidence diminished is the offender himself. To be sure, this false claim of greater liberty is more
clearly challenged when the public knows that this repudiation of
false valuation of others' rights is happening. But there is something good that is achieved even when the state communicates its
denial of the criminal's false valuations only to the offender himself. 9 3 That good is the good of retributive justice.
Note that retribution is constrained: its purpose is to communicate to the offender that his untethering violates the basic legal structure that he had good (or overriding) reason to accept as a
presumptively reasonable and rational person in the company of
others similarly recognized by him as reasonable and rational. 1' It
follows then that if the offender is incompetent, then the mens rea
behind the untethering cannot exist.1 95 The offender, then, must
understand that he is experiencing retribution even if he does not
accept the reasons for it.196

The act of untetlhering oneself by a criminal act, it should be
observed, is not exactly the same as free riding off the order pro-

say that something is valuable that we ought to care about preserving and acknowledging that
value." Hampton, supra note 138, at 1684.
193. The fact that there may be duties of transparency does not diminish my fundamental
point: namely, that communication to the offender of his wrongful behavior is of at least some
significance. All else flows from that.
194. See John C.P. Goldberg, Rights and Wrongs, 97 MICH. L REV. 1828, 1839 (1999) (reviewing ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW (1999)) (relaying Ripstein's

argument that punishment is necessary to denounce a criminal's behavior that "shows contempt
for the very idea that he must conduct himself with due regard for the basic interests of others).
195. One implication of this theory so far is that culpability has more valence than harm as a
determinant in how severely one should be punished, and thus, there is no intrinsic reason, for
example, to distinguish between failed and successful attempts. For even a failed attempt is
nonetheless an act that manifests "the criminal's substitution of calculating, private rationality
for public reasonableness." Id. at 1841. Some might argue that there is a further distinction:
namely, that a completed crime "is conduct through which an actor consciously puts his interests
ahead of others so as to cause a rights violation," and this is worse "because it has wrought
greater damage to the scheme of rights protected by the law" Id. at 1842. I do not appreciate the
"greater damage" to the scheme of rights here, since if all that distinguishes an attempted from a
completed crime is a matter of luck, it is hard to discern what extra harm to the scheme ofrights
attaches.

196. What does it mean to understand without accepting? Is it to deny on principle the
state's legitimacy or the wrongfulness of breaking the law that one broke? Is it like being a jailed
anthropologist who says, "Oh, these people punish rape, which is rather odd; I guess I now understand that it is against their laws, even though where I am from, it is perfectly acceptable to
treat others as the extension of one's sexual imagination." Well, the phrase "to understand without accepting" means that the criminal comprehends that the government thinks he has violated
a law with which he could reasonably be expected to comply as either citizen or visitor to the
country in which he resides. Despite that comprehension, he may think that the government got
the wrong guy, or perhaps they got the right person, but given his circumstances, the government should have been more lenient to him, etc.
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vided in a stable social union by others' good behavior.197 The language of free riding implies that everyone else would enjoy the
benefit of murder or robbery, when in fact many of us would not
derive any satisfaction from that license. 198 Viewing retribution
only as a means of limiting free riding thus conceives the issue too
narrowly. It wrongly presumes we all have the motivation to do
wrongful acts. Moreover, on the free riding view, it is not clear that
ending the free riding is the task of the state. 199 The idea of
untethering, on the other hand, more accurately captures the more
significant responsibility of participating in the reasonable but significant obligations of a larger social enterprise, and thus intimates
the role the state needs to play here.
The metaphor of untethering needs strengthening though.
For the offender by his unlawful act does more than just withdraw
or cut himself off from society. As stated earlier, the criminal act is
a claim of superiority by the criminal over other citizens and the
polity itself. Leaving this criminal act unaddressed provides evidence for this claim of superiority because the unaddressed actus
reus (or, morally wrong act) creates the impression that the offender is justified in his claim of superiority. Thus, by responding to
his crime for what it is, we are destroying (or at least diminishing)
the evidence for this false claim. The criminal experiences the denial of his claim to superiority through the state's application of
coercive force. That the encounter may transform the offender so
that he internalizes the values symbolized by the confrontation
(equal liberty under law) is a valuable bonus, but it is not required.
What justifies the act of retribution is the good achieved by placing
the criminal in a position where he can no longer make that claim
of superiority with plausible evidence.
The retributive encounter thus connects the criminal with
the purpose of affirming equal treatment under law; it cannot
therefore be claimed that the good of retribution is uncertain or external in character. By denying the plausibility of a criminal's claim
to superiority to the offender himself, retribution achieves a second
good whose character is in no way uncertain.

197. This is Herbert Morris's well-known theory. See MORRIS, supra note 180, at 31.
198. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 143, at 116.
199. What about societies that have socially recognized castes or classes in place-can they
delegate retribution to the state? It may depend on the legitimacy of the regime; if an entirely
religious and homogeneous society including the offender himself accepted the rule of the priests,
then his act would still constitute an act of political rebellion that may properly be squelched.
But the proof of such acquiescence may be a tall order. The argument of the text applies chiefly
to societies such as ours, or to those that aspire to be like ours in the relevant respects.
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The account thus far may appear insufficient to establish
that it is the state, and not some private person or agency, that
should enact retribution. Why should the state play the central and
exclusive role in criminal justice? After all, it is only a modern phenomenon that the state has assumed this central role; as shown in
Part I, clergymen and other communal figures used to play an extensive role in administering punishment. Moreover, today the
state's monopoly on punishment is under attack again. In a provocative article, Dan Kahan has said that it is time "to get over" the
kind of thinking about criminal law that permits the state to "monopolize" legitimate force: "Just as air travel and telecommunications have been freed from inefficient forms of centralized control,
so punishment is due for a liberating dose of privatization." 20 0 Suggesting that the state's criminal laws are insufficiently respected by
inner-city communities, Kahan contends that in the face of such
"enfeebled legitimacy" the answer is to rely on the moral authority
of a multitude of private institutions and actors such as the "Black
church and juveniles."2 01 Kahan, oddly, seems to prefer exacerbating the allegedly enfeebled legitimacy of the state instead of succoring it. To address him, I need to answer the question-what justifies the state's role in punishment?
The state plays the role of the exclusive decisionmaker (at
least with respect to punishment) because it, and it alone, has the
capacity for legitimacy among all actors in society in a way that
various communal institutions could not in our pluralistic social
union of social unions. 20 2 Kahan's empirical claims-that various
subcommunities no longer recognize the state's legitimacy-are not
only implausible, they are inconceivable from an ex ante viewpoint.
The communities of which he speaks may be opposed to the harsh
federal or state drug laws that require stiff mandatory minimum
sentences. But Kahan marshals no evidence to suggest that they
think some other political body has a more legitimate claim to legislate, adjudicate, and punish them in a society with demographics
like ours. Moreover, if we are interested in, as we should be, what
someone would choose ex ante, that is, not knowing whether she
will be black, white, male, female, etc., we would have little reason
to be stirred by Kahan's provocations. Instead, we would embrace

200. Dan M. Kahan, PrivatizingCriminalLaw: Strategiesfor PriuateNorm Enforcement in
the Inner City, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1859 (1999).
201. Id. at 1862.
202. See generallyJOHN RALs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). The fact ofsocial pluralism is
in part what motivates and justifies reliance upon an impartial agent, such as the state, to administer justice in modern times.
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the procedural cautions that characterize state action in a constitutional regime.
But there is a further, more fundamental reason for the
state's involvement in retribution. Note that while revenge rarely
occurs for acts that are not immediately or transparently victimoriented, retribution, by contrast, occurs for acts that are either
malum in se (prohibited by nature) or malum prohibitum (prohibited by convention of the state). This distinction helps to capture
the idea that there are some wrongs, such as treason or forgery, for
203
which the victim is collective and not specifically identifiable.
The state is the appropriate agent of retribution because the
crime, even if it is "victimless," is a rebellion against the government's rule-making authority. The state has a vital interest in protecting both the particular determinations of the people regarding
the rules of property, liability, and inalienability 2 4 and the process
through which those determinations are made. As a result, the
state has an obligation to defend itself against those who flout its
rules and encroach upon a decision-making authority that they
have (or would have) chosen ex ante. On this understanding, every
crime is fundamentally an act of political rebellion and punish205
ments serve as measures of war against those rebellions.
Rebellions vary in strength of course and so the resources
husbanded to quell the rebellions should also vary appropriately to
avoid waste. But a legitimate regime has not only the right but also
the obligation to protect itself from these encroachments, for to do
nothing to a offender when something is possible is to fail to take
the moral agency of individuals seriously, constituting a prima facie
injustice; and to make no effort at pursuing the correct offender is
to tell the victim of the crime that the moral injury she experienced
does not count. Just because the victim might be, in some cases, the
collectivity or the popular sovereign does not mean that the suffer-

203. Joel Feinberg and Jean Hampton have separately explained the basis for why thoso
wrongs should also be subject to state punishment. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING
3-38 (1986); Hampton, supra note 138, at 1690.
204. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1009 (1972). This idea is manifested
outside the realm of economic theorizing as well. See generally ROBERT NoziCK, ANARCHY, STATE
AND UTOPIA (1974) (observing that the state helps protect rights, which provide moral spaco);
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983) (contending that social structures must obstruct

illegitimate incursions across "spheres" of social intercourse that are characterized by differenti.
ated meanings and currencies of exchange).

205. Cf. NIETZSCHE, supra note 158, at 81 (describing punishment as, among other things, a
measure of war against those who are enemies of peace in the community).
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ing endured or the insult to the legitimacy of the political decision20 6
making regime is not real.

Let me say this more clearly: even where crimes are "merely"
malum prohibitum, and there is no apparent victim, the state has a
prima facie obligation deriving, in a sense, from a contract to fulfill.
Just because the "victim" of the crime may be the state and society
at large does not mean the state may waive its duty to pursue an
offender of a legal wrong.2 07 When a wrong occurs, it occurs against
the body that decided that some particular act was a wrong. 203 Al-

206. What I have said on this point applies to legitimately constituted regimes. Does it mean
by implication that the state loses its right and duty to seek retribution when it is founded and
maintained tyrannically? If so, does that mean the state cannot (morally) punish me for stealing
your car when it is a wicked regime? Certainly the state's right to punish becomes attenuated
when the state itself is an instrument of the few for the repression against the many. See generally JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Marxism and Retribution, in RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 93
(1979). Murphy's point focuses on the economic stratification that exists in capitalist societies.
This focus is odd by my lights. All uses of the state's coercive powers deserve scrutiny and few, if
any, uses of state power are legitimate when the state operates without duly constituted authority, that is, without legitimacy. But, if we are to avoid infantilizing persons and reducing them to
the sum of their material wants, then the stratification on which to focus attention has to be a
political one, not an economic one. Thus, we would have to focus on crimes of a more clearly
political nature, crimes whose offenders can be said to be acting in civil disobedience: that is,
crimes committed with expressivist motivations by offenders who are willing ultimately to submit to the system's judgments. Cf. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail(1963).
at http://www.nobelprizes.com/nobel/peace/MLK-jaiLhtml (last visited Aug. 24, 2001). To return
to the question above: Does that mean an illegitimate state can never engage in rightful punishment? I think we would have to view the institutions as pathologically generated, but it is far
from clear to me at least that each practice, and each instance within that practice, is necessarily
defective. One way to handle this is to create a rebuttable presumption that in cases like this,
the state lacks authority to punish. Cf. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 788-89 (La. 1993) (creating
rebuttable presumption that appointed counsel in a particular district were ineffective counsel,
as a matter of state constitutional law, due to resource constraints on them).
What about the claim that in a state that creates, permits, or perpetuates gros stratification, certain crimes are desirable and/or liberating, since the acts are serving as worthy rebellions against an unjust order? This claim might be defensible for crimes against the state and its
corporate structure, but it is harder to justify for crimes against individuals.
207. I recognize that some reject the ascription of mental states or intentions to collectivities
that are legal fictions, such as the democratic state or corporations. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel &
Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 320 (1996) (C[L]egal fictions cannot
commit criminal acts .... [nor] can they possess mens rea, a guilty state of mind."). But this
conclusion has been persuasively challenged by expressivist theorists. See Anderson & Pildes,
supra note 165, at 1504-06. All that is necessary for a collective agent to have mental states that
can be expressed is that its
members ... be capable of understanding themselves as expressing such mental states. The members are not, however, the final authorities about the meanings of their actions. The expressive meaning of collective actions is a matter of
public and shared meanings.... While the process of determining the expressive meaning of any particular action will undoubtedly be complex, there is no
reason in principle that the democratic State cannot be viewed expressively.
Id. at 1527.
208. Here I depart from Kant, who wrote that the prerogative of the majesty includes the
ability to pardon crimes against the state. See KANT, supra note 4, at 145.
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though that body may decide prospectively to change what it views
as a wrong, it would be a breach of duty for the branch that enforces the law to make no effort at enforcing already existing and
valid laws passed at the behest of the appropriate legislature. To do
nothing betrays the obligations the state has to its masters: the
people. Accordingly, the state serves to protect not only the equal
rights of individuals but also the decision-making regime agreed
upon by the people at the time. 20 9 That said, explicit grants of discretion might resolve the problem. 2 10 On this account, retributivism
as a justification for punishment is enmeshed within a larger political theory embracing equal liberty under a legitimate rule of law
that respects the institutional design in matters ranging from separation of powers to federalism. 2 11 To be sure, these institutions are
respected not only from a formalistic perspective, but also because
2 12
they serve to constrain and disperse power and decision making.
We see then three internal goods achieved by retribution: the
affirmation of moral agency; the effectuation of equal liberty under
law; and the state's defense of its decision-making authority, which
may also be understood as compliance with its authorizing charter. 2 13 These three goods form the basis of what I call the internal
intelligibility of retribution. They explain, I hope, the justificatory
force behind the notion of desert that has been central to prior conceptions of retribution.
Although we might have justified retribution, we have not
yet fully obligated it. I alluded earlier to one partial source of obligation: namely, the breach of duty the state as our agent owes us in
protecting the decision-making regime we agreed upon (or would
have chosen ex ante). In this sense, retribution is obligatory upon
the state because it fulfills the state's promise to those who generated the political compact in which a certain decision-making system would be preserved and equality under law defended.
A bit more is needed to give shape to this claim. To see retribution as a duty, it is helpful to consider what the world looks like

209. The implication, as suggested earlier, is that a regime whose decisionmaking power is illegitimate has less moral claim to punish those without fair and formal access to participate in
decisionmaking for political matters. See supra note 206.
210. This is a topic I will tackle in an article tentatively entitled ProsecutorialDiscretion in
the Administrative State.
211. This angle in particular is often ignored by other theorists of retribution.
212. This is not dissimilar to the familiar ideal of subsidiarity in natural law theorizing. For
a brief overview, see generally ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAV 239-41 (1999).
213. Thus, for a state not to punish is to renege on a deal made between the representatives
and the citizens.

2001]

SHAMI7NG PUNISHMENTS

2203

in the alternative, where a taste for retribution is deemed no different in kind, urgency, or intensity than a taste for gnocchi. In such a
world, one can decide not to have retribution for a particular murder with the same caprice that motivates a desire to have gnocchi
one night instead of gazpacho. The reason this picture is unattractive stems from a particular sensibility: namely an awareness of the
injustice we cause by not pursuing these internal goods. 214 Leaving
a legal wrong unaddressed gives the offender the misimpression
that he may exercise superiority over others with the imprimatur of
the state. Retribution, which is, by definition, performed by the
state, corrects this misimpression.
Retribution, then, is justified by virtue of what it does. It
does not undo a past crime-that would be impossible. Rather, as
Jean Hampton has written, the criminal message of that past actthe claim of superiority-is contested. 2 5 As Hegel puts it, the annulment demonstrates "the non-being [and thus, non-validity] of
the criminal principle" which is the enactment of a belief in an "arbitrary and unrestrained freedom of the will."216 Because punish-

ment presupposes legal wrongdoing by the punished, retribution
leaves no moral possibility of intentionally punishing innocent people for the benefit of a grand utilitarian calculus, as other theories
2 17
might require or permit.

214. I think we have a prima facie duty not to cause injustice, but this is not quite the same
as saying that we cannot abide any injustice. Here, I depart from Kant, who wrote that "ifjustice
goes, there is no longer any value in men's living on the earth." KANT, supra note 4, at 141. Contrary to Kants prescription that justice must be done though the heavens should fall, I side with
those who recognize that justice is only one part of human well-being, but not the whole of it, and
that therefore, certain compromises must be made in the face of what Michael Walzer calls cases
of "supreme emergency." See MICHAEL WALZER JUST AND UNJUST WARS 251-63 (1977).
215. See Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retributiuism, in RETRItIVMSN AND ITS
CRITIcs 15 (W. Cragg ed., 1992).
216. Alan Brudner, Retributivism and lte Death Penally, 30 U. TORONro LJ. 337, 346
(1980). Brudner's account draws heavily from G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT paras. 97-99
(T.M. Knox trans., 1967).
217. This is generally viewed as one of the more attractive features of the retributivist account. See, e.g., Brudner, supra note 216, at 347. Utilitarians often respond by distinguishing
between act and rule utility and thus incorporate a rule of desert within their framework; alternatively, they say the demoralization costs to others are high if people knew the innocent would
get punished, and so incorporate desert as a general matter. But there would be no protection for
this rule when the exceptions are chosen with "sufficient selectivity or with sufficient isolation
that the general level of social anxiety or unpredictability does not increase." MURPHY &
COLEMAN, supra note 138, at 122. There is something uncharitable about this critique, though,
because it fails to credit the sincerity of utilitarians with respect to their allegiance to the requirements that would make law possible. Cf. Rawls, supra note 10, at 4-5 (resolving the distinction between utilitarian and retributivist justifications for punishment on the basis that utilitarian arguments are "appropriate" for "justifying a practice as a system of rules to be applied and
enforced").
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An important point about the baselines for a sentencing policy emerges if we see retribution as the state's attempt to diminish
the evidence of a false claim of greater liberty: retribution need not
always require pain or the deprivation of liberty. 2 18 Some accounts,
such as Hegel's, certainly permit the infliction of suffering upon the
wrongdoer, perhaps with lex talionis serving as the upper bound.
But once we appreciate Hampton's understanding of what Hegelian
annulment really is-the denial of a certain kind of message by the
criminal-then retribution need only ensure that the criminal understands, if not accepts, that the state is nullifying as best as it
can the claim of superiority.
To annul the crime's message, one need not inflict pain or
deprive the criminal of his liberty. Incarceration, after all, is only a
recent obsession. Two old examples illustrate the point. The King of
Persia in the Book of Esther required the wicked Haman to lead
Mordecai through the equivalent of a ticker-tape parade. 219 Paul
went further, arguing in Romans 12:20-21 that, rather than lash
out, one should feed one's enemy and quench his thirst, for to do so
is to "heap coals of fire on his head." As Hampton explains, Paul's
point is to make the offender "feel humbled in the face of kindness,"
which in other words is to induce guilt. 220 Ceremonies and incongruous kindness will not always lead to a successful denial of the
criminal message-prison might do that better-but there is no
reason to suspect that ceremonies or rituals will never work. The
state may devise other options to carry out the annulment.
Let me recapitulate the main features of this account so far.
First, because punishment presupposes legal wrongdoing on retributive accounts, there is no room within retributivism for punishing innocent people, at least not intentionally. 221 Second, retribution for wrongdoing is not merely "suffering" for the sake of a social
goal external to the relationship of the offender and the state, but
rather should be viewed as a valuable practice independent of ex-

218. One should note that just because retributivist account has certain aims (e.g., annulling
the evidence of a claim to greater liberty and affirming the dignity of the offender, among others), this does not make it a utilitarian account; there is a distinction between affirming a practice because of its internal telos and judging the value of the act by its effects, as a utilitarian
would. Compare S.I. Benn, An Approach to the Problems of Punishment, in FREEDOM AND
RESPONSIBILITY 517 (H. Morris ed., 1961), with Thornton, supra note 178, at 85.
219. Esther 6:11 (New King James).

220. See Hampton, supra note 215, at 16.
221. Note that this negative thesis is insufficient on its own to commend retributivism because it is compatible with the position on prohibiting punishment altogether. See J.L. Mackie,
Retributivism: A Test Case for Ethical Objectivity, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Joel Feinberg & H.
Gross eds., 1986).
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ternal goods. Third, retribution is not only an internally valuable
practice, but also an obligation. For to do nothing in the face of
unlawful wrongs grants plausibility to the claim by offenders of unequal liberty under law, leaves a lie about the moral reality of our
social world uncorrected, 222 and, by permitting the tyrannical usurpation of public decision making by rogue individuals, -2 doing nothing causes the state to breach its quasi-contractual obligation to
protect that order of decision making. The state resists these injustices by ensuring a connection "designed to bring home to the offender the nature of his criminal act."224 The state, however, has

latitude to determine how that connection is made. This is because
"the nature of the criminal act" is a fact that is interpreted in a particular culture and a particular time: legislators are the ones interpreting the criminal act and they may properly, i.e., democratically,
denominate what counts as meriting more severe penalties and
what should not, based on a variety of factors including, but not
limited to, social cost and deterrence. 225
This leads us to the third feature of retributivism, namely,
the requirement that punishment be meted out in a predictable and
impartial way. The impartiality requirement does not betoken identical treatment of all offenders. 226 Impartial here means that the
criteria invoked to justify different results in sentencing for two
offenders of the same kind of crime can be identified clearly before
we know who the offender is specifically. Thus, a decision by the
state to shorten a long sentence of incarceration for X and not Y
may be justifiable if certain preconditions are met-for example, X
offender has come forward and provided substantial assistance to

222. As noted earlier, it is the offender who must see the message annulled; however, consistent with other concerns, it is desirable for the public (including the victim) to witness or have
knowledge that the message is being annulled.
223. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRLMINAL LAW 35 (1998).
224. Id. (citing ROBERT NOZICK PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 374-80 (1981)).

225. I leave for another day the concern, deriving from public choice theory, that legislators
have incentives to overcriminalize through the use of very broadly drafted statutes.
226. Again, here we can depart from Kant, who, at least in matters of crimes against persons, rather than the state, would be incensed by the prospect that not all crimes of the same
class are punished identically. See KANT, supra note 4, at 141. Fletcher, interpreting Kant, emphasizes for example that Kant would despise the notion that cooperation with the state would
result in different treatment. See FLETCHER, supra note 223, at 36. A better understanding questions what is at stake with equality, suggesting that there is a difference between treating people
equally and treating them the same. If some offenders manifest evidence of understanding the
gravity of their wrongdoing, say, by coming forward, then there is no argument from equality
that they should necessarily be put in the same circumstances as those who did not. The harm
they cause to the public and its resources is considerably diminished because the polity does not
have to expend energy and money on investigations or lengthy trials.
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the state. 227 Impartial also means being free from bias in the application of the law to the facts of this offender; indeed this is the
hallmark of impartiality, and this aspect of impartiality helps
228
distinguish retribution from revenge.
Much of what I said above explains why the person who is
guilty of wrongdoing should be punished. It is equally useful to explain how what I have said affects the related question: why the
innocent should not be punished. For on the account offered, we can
see that the innocent person has made no assertion of greater than
equal liberty against others, he has not rebelled against the state,
and he should recognize the wrongness of legal wrongdoing, given
that he had good reason ex ante to accept the legitimacy and authority of the laws that emerged from the regime he participates in
as a citizen in a liberal democracy.
If there is no account here that permits the knowing punishment of an innocent, one might wonder whether the state can
tolerate any error rate greater than zero. Is the punishment still
valuable if the punished defendant is actually innocent? The answer in short depends upon the error rate's causes. If the average
person thinks the state has taken all reasonable steps to reduce
errors affecting truth-seeking in the proceedings, a person might
still quite reasonably choose ex ante to have the social practice of
punishment.
C. Retribution, Social Meaning, and Proportionality
Retribution does not claim that the features of a fitting punishment are absolutely consistent across time and place. As Aristotle observed long ago, human affairs simply cannot brook precision of this sort. 22 9 An obligation to punish neither entails nor specifies a code of sentencing that is impervious to the variations across
history and culture. As suggested earlier in the discussion of expressivism, the meaning of punishment-just like wrongdoing-is
contingent upon the cues, linguistic customs, and conventions of a
given society.
To see this better, it may be helpful to distinguish the social
meaning of a punishment from the communication of that meaning,

227. See Markel, supra note 11, at 389.
228. This distinction is important for this Article's thesis about the incompatibility of retri.

bution and shaming punishments. See infra Part IV.A.
229. See ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 1 (J.A.K.

Thomson trans., Penguin Books, rev. ed. 1976).

2001]

SHAMING PUNISRMNTS

2207

and to distinguish how the social meaning is communicated to the
offender from how it is communicated to the public. In other words,
planting the flag of retribution is different from the perception of
that planting by the public at large (the visibility of the flag to others). This metaphor may help illustrate the conceptual separation
of the retributivist position from the social denunciativist position.
Punishment's dependence on social meaning is a dependence
on the statement that the law makes in a particular time and place.
A good instance of retribution should effectively communicate the
nature of the wrongdoing and, by that communication, annul the
offender's criminal message. The primary and necessary target of
that communication must be the offender.2 0 The offender must be
able to understand that he is experiencing this retribution. Thus, if
a state decided to punish the criminal with insults, the retributive
nature of the insults would not be realized if the criminal did not
speak the language in which the insults were delivered. The state
need only act in some fashion that reflects the rejection of the claim
of superiority. Hence, state coercion (as retribution) is only required
to the extent necessary to effectuate that rejection of superiority.3 1
There is also a flip side to consider with respect to social
meaning. For if what I just said counsels some degree of frugality in
punishment, it is important that retributivists understand crimes
(and punishments) as social phenomena. Once we consider punishment as a social practice, we have to consider it ex ante, as one attractive practice among others. Once viewed as a social institution
responding to a social problem, retributivism must consider the social cost dimension of the wrong and then calibrate the severity of
the response. The wrong, when including a social cost dimension
and viewed from the ex ante viewpoint, may include costs of investigation, adjudication, punishment, as well as collateral effects on
the community. 232 The practice of rape, for example, affects not only
230. This is the core of my bare-bones retributivism. Retributivism, as I have explained it, is
a theory that serves as the foundation and sine qua non of criminal justice; it does not foreclose
the incorporation of compatible measures that satisfy social denunciativists or restorative visions
of justice. For instance, the state may decide, if all parties are amenable, to host criminal-victim
conferences, to require detoxification programs in conjunction with or posterior to the punishment, etc. These decisions, in the main, go to sentencing, and sentencing is a policy matter that
should be chosen using the ex ante heuristic to the extent possible, that is, except for when the
type of government response is at odds with the underlying values that motivate retribution.
231. Conversely, a recalcitrant recidivist may need a longer or harsher sentence. This account may give some justification for the "three strikes and you're out" rules adopted in various
American jurisdictions.
232. One makes these assessments as legislators do, with attention to the generality of the
cases and the awareness that ex ante we would not want all resources spent on one social project, however worthy.
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the victims, but also others in the neighborhood (the fear of going
out at night alone) and the tax base from which expenses in finding
and punishing the offenders are incurred. 233 This does not mean
that we calibrate the social cost of a particular instance of a particular kind of crime and then figure out the sentence. Rather, it
means that we try to understand the gravity of the wrongdoing as a
general matter and then make our best estimate of the fitting punishment. During this analysis, we might assess the gravity of certain crimes as including the difficulties associated with the probability of detection, and thus increase the penalty if we thought
that would be best from the ex ante perspective.
On this view, it might be perfectly plausible for the legislature to determine that a person's theft of one hundred dollars has
social costs of six hundred dollars. This may be a result of the fact
that the offender engaged in conduct that is extremely hard to detect or to prosecute; 234 thus, there is no reason to suspect that effective communication to the offender will only be the clawback of one
hundred dollars. 235
So, while it is true that the classical Kantian understanding
of retribution asserts that justice requires punishment in equal
amounts to the crime, and that each offender of the same crime
should be punished equally, 236 it is not absolutely necessary for our

own account that proportionality in some crude and primitive sense
constitute the appropriate punishment. 23 7 One obviously does not,
as Blackstone observed, punish forgery with more forgery.

233. Some might also deem it reasonable from the ex ante position to include a separate mul.
tiplier to the punishment because ex ante we know we will not be able to detect and prosecute
every violation, and optimal deterrence may require that type of kicker to operate. The problem,
which is not insoluble, is that it charges offenders a cost for crimes they did not commit, which
arguably fails to respect their individual personhood and what they have done. One possible
response might be that we would choose to add a deterrence kicker at the ex ante position, and

so, when an offender is punished with a multiplier effect, it is morally permissible because he
would have chosen that multiplier effect himself, not knowing what position he would occupy

later on. Viewed this way, it becomes harder to make the claim that we are failing to respect
one's personhood.
234. Cybercrime is a good example of this problem. It is remarkably easier to leave virtually
no traces of your crime in cyberspace than it is in real space.
235. Again, the generality of cases forecloses concern about the odd case where someone who
steals one hundred dollars from some wealthy person and is able to save lives by buying inexpensive foodstuffs for the poor and hungry.
236. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BAsIc CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 78-89 (1996).
237. One could rehabilitate the Kantian position on proportionality, which is often identified
with lex talionis, partially by saying that the crime is not merely the theft of one hundred dollars
from the victim but includes the damage and moral injury done to the public and the state. And
it is important for us not to run together two separate questions: retribution theory primarily
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Clearly, the ex ante perspective does not yield absolutely determinate answers in sentencing. 238 There will be contextual and
cultural judgments regarding what one's blameworthiness is and
how to interpret a particular wrong within the general scheme of
things. It might well be that ex ante we would say that if the state
determines (ex post) that the offender has taken responsibility for
his actions, there is no necessary reason to inflict further suffering
as such. That said, part of what it means to understand the falsity
of one's claim to superiority is to undergo measures that make clear
that understanding.
Other implications of this account need to be explored further. I said earlier that the retributive encounter must occur (subject to the preceding caveats) and that the encounter must have
cognitive content. That cognitive content must possess two features.
First, the offender must see the criminal message of his wrong contested and denied, and second, that denial must be made by the apparatus of the state. I need to be clearer about this content.
Because our account depends upon notions of moral agency
and social welfare, we cannot avert our eyes from the damage that
an ill-conceived act of retribution has upon those responsible for
punishing the offender. 239 When we ask a citizen to kill, maim, or
otherwise brutalize another human being, we have to be concerned
about the effects that might have upon that particular citizen, as
well as upon the object of that conduct.2 40 As a result, I suggest a
further requirement of retribution, one that goes to the intent and
method of the state's coercive force. What might this mean?
Well, to insist only on the offender's perception of his defeat,
to the exclusion of the potential internalization of correct values
answers what justifies punishment; it only secondarily advocates that the amount of punishment
be proportional to the crime, which is a separate matter, a matter of sentencing.
238. I want to underscore this point: the claims I have made on behalf of retributivism are
not imperialistic in scope. That is, many of the concerns central to restorative justice, social denunciation, victims' rights, deterrence, etc., could be made compatible with the theory outlined
above because most of these other concerns would be factored into an analysis of the sentencing
policy ex ante.
239. We might say that the principle of "frugality" requires us not to expend more force than
is necessary to achieve our justifiable goals. We want law enforcement officers (whether police
officers or prison guards) to be firm without becoming sadistic. The code of conduct to which they
adhere should be one that lets them know they are participating in an enterprise that is not only
necessary, but also dignified. The current system of imprisonment, needless to say, does not
always adhere to this standard. See generally ACLU National Prison Project, at
http://www.aclu.org/issueslprisonsnpp-mission.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2001) (detailing prison
abuses).
240. See Herbert, supra note 96; Witness to an Execution, A Day in the Life of a Death Row
Employee, at http://www.npr.org/programs/atc/witness (last visited Oct. 12, 2000) (describing
documentary of Texan executioners and the traumas they experience).
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that the confrontation encourages, would undermine the justificatory prong first discussed, namely the interest we have in recognizing each other as moral agents capable of responsible decision making.24 1 In order to militate against the corrosive effect punishment

may have upon those meting it out, it is crucial that the denial of
the criminal message is explained and carried out in a way that is
conducive to the internalization of the values that the retributive
encounter is meant to uphold. The encounter need not guarantee
the internalization of those values, but it cannot proceed without
the desire for that result. 242 Otherwise, retribution would operate

mechanistically, a practice that devalues both the punisher and
punishment itself.243 Consequently, the state must have as its hope
not just the denial of the offender's claim of superiority, but also his
transformation. We must heed Nietzsche's warning and not punish
from ressentiment. 244 This is the intent requirement of the CCR.
Does any of this ultimately reveal this Article to be an attempt at resuscitating rehabilitative theories of punishment? I do
not think so. Under the account I have offered the state is not principally interested in playing a central role in the therapy of the offender so much as it seeks to ensure the cognizance of correct values by the offender. 245 It would be tragic if the impetus to heal and
mend our world through talk of rehabilitation waged an aggressive
war against the sense of moral freedom and responsibility that
helps make a life worthy of authentic existence. That said, there is
nothing incompatible between pursuing and imposing a retributive
encounter with the offender and then, once that encounter has concluded, permitting attempts by the state (or other groups within

241. Thus, the account I have offered differs sharply from that of a retributivist like Finnis,
who talks of a murderer forfeiting his basic rights, including a right to life. See JOHN FINNIS,
FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS 129-30 (1983). I think this idea of forfeiture is fundamentally at odds
with Finnis's otherwise plausible and attractive theory of the good. See FINNIS, supra note 31, at
118-27.

242. Thus, capital punishment is forbidden, because by ending the life of the offender it fore.
closes the aspirational point of the practice, which is the reconstruction of a moral self. Once the

execution occurs, there is no further opportunity for the offender to act with fidelity to the value
for which the criminal law stands.
243. For an interesting portrait of this phenomenon in historical detail, see Whitman, supra
note 21, at 1070-72, and see also NOZICK, supra note 224, and Hampton, supra note 215.
244. See NIETZSCHE, supra note 158, at pt. I.

245. One reason to resist rehabilitative theories that require enormous and disproportionate
expenditures of social resources on criminals is that the claim on those resources is morally
weaker when made by a criminal than when made by someone whose behavior has already ex.
hibited greater fidelity to law. However, empirical study of the matter may show that an investment in reintegration will yield lower recidivism costs, and this is surely a worthy concern of
statecraft and crime control policy.
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civil society) to encourage criminals to learn useful skills and to in246
culcate the habits of sociability in its former convicts.

Let us now distinguish the above account of retribution from
the social denunciativist account. Imagine that a person commits a
typical crime (e.g., theft), and is then tried fairly, but in secret, so
that the encounter between the state and the criminal is not known
by the general public. The trial has familiar evidentiary requirements, access to legal counsel, and so on. The accused is convicted. 247 The severity of the sentence accords with the ex ante notion of proportionality discussed earlier. The thought experiment
simply says it is a typical trial and a typical punishment; it is just
that the record of this conviction will not be publicly available. No
public reconciliation and no potential social condemnation are ever
achieved because of the secrecy, so the encounter has no socially
expressive value. It will not satisfy the average person's taste for
fairness in a particular case, nor will ignorance of the trial damage
the average person's confidence in the legal system. It also has no
2general deterrence value. 8
Is there still value to the secret retribution? On the account
offered here, the answer is yes, and therefore it is to be preferred to
a situation where no retribution occurs at all. This is because the
confrontational relationship has its own internal goals and goods
that are achieved. Some might say that the good brought about is
that the offender is brought to justice. My goal has been to elucidate that claim. By its efforts, the state diminishes the plausibility
of evidence to a claim of superiority and complies with the charter
that gives the state its legitimacy. 249 Secret and fair punishments
are better than no punishments at all on this account because the

246. Pursuant to this goal, states may need to reconsider whether laws that continue to
stigmatize criminals after they have been punished, such as sex offender notification statutes or
diminished voting rights laws, can be justified. Cf. Small, supra note 73, at 1467-68 (describing
harassment and violence directed towards sex offenders).
247. The experiment would not change if the offender decided to plea.bargain, as the overwhelming majority of criminals do in the United States.
248. It is true that if incarceration were the response, the punishment would serve the function of incapacitation and may thus reduce the likelihood that the offender will commit crimes
outside the prison; however, other types of responses are possible that would still be punishment.
Imagine the appropriate punishment was a criminal fine. But this might have some prospective
benefit too, such as the specific deterrence of the offender.
249. Of course, if the charter required transparency, then it would be a breach here, but ex
hypothesis, this is not a problem.
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encounter between state and criminal itself effectuates the ideals of
treating citizens as morally responsible agents living as free and
2 50
equal citizens.
As long as one accepts that some secret and fair punishment
is better than no punishment at all, one can grasp the internal intelligibility of retribution. The theorist seeking general deterrence
or publicly expressed condemnation cannot appreciate the desirability of this practice. The retributivist can. Although the retributivists might approve of the byproducts of public awareness of punishment (deterrence, denunciation, social self-defense, and reconciliation), the retributive encounter is valuable independent of
those reasons. Indeed, there may be a host of ancillary benefits. 25 '
None of this is to say, however, that we should prefer secret
retribution to transparent retribution. Indeed, the account I have
offered indicates the duty to some degree of transparency in the
administration of criminal justice. For the state's concealment of
the encounter can be read by citizens as a message of inactivity by
the state, which would itself run afoul of the principal-agent relation that motivates the state's participation in the matter. Not
meeting the transparency requirement does not itself vitiate the
good of the confrontation between state and offender, but it does
create its own moral problems that ought to be avoided.
To be sure, appreciating the intelligibility of this "secondbest" type of retribution does not mandate its enactment in all circumstances. A commitment to retribution can only be intelligible
and reasonable when situated among other moral commitments
that create and perpetuate a good society. It is vital that retributivists realize that there are other goods and other values necessary to
human flourishing that must be advanced, sometimes at the cost of

250. It is a harder question regarding whether we could say we would want this as a social
practice, as a law that would implement this practice. I think our hesitation to do so is because
we are so used to enjoying the benefits of public transparency with respect to punishment and
because our other commitments to transparency and accountability, coupled with skepticism of
the possibility of fair punishments occurring as a general matter, make it difficult for us to imag.
ine this as an ongoing social practice. But I am prepared to acknowledge that secret but fair
punishment is a sub-optimal arrangement. The real question is whether we would prefer it to a
state of affairs where there was no punishment at all. I think we would agree that there is some
value to what is going on.
251. Chief among them is the interest that the rest of society has in verifying that the proposition of equal liberty under law is still being vouchsafed by its government. Note, however, that
some of those ancillary benefits could be realized without having to visit pain or deprivation of
liberty upon each offender. The healing victims might gain from knowledge of punishment that
could be gained through other forms of therapy made available by the state or other bodies
within civil society.
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the project of retributive justice itself. This realization helps explain why Kant's endorsement of the strong sense of retributive justice-in which he abjures all responsibility for the consequences of
his actions-is wrong from the moral point of view. Whereas Kant
appears to require the confrontation between the state and offender, most reasonable people will recognize that this obligation
will never be absolute. We would never expect nor deem reasonable
an effort to spend a society's entire resources on the pursuit of one
offender, or on all offenders for that matter. Doing so would be positively suicidal, and would thus jeopardize the possibility for the ongoing of human flourishing. Thus, to impose rules such as statutes
of limitations, which evidence some (unwitting) sensitivity to social
cost, or rules governing procedural due process, may be deemed
2
reasonable at some point along a spectrum of possibilities.
Moreover, there is a continuum regarding the quantum of
resources that ought to be expended in achieving accuracy in adjudication. A dollar spent in administering matters of retributive justice amounts to a dollar less available to adjudicate matters of corrective justice. And it may be a dollar less for feeding the hungry.
Recognition of social costs is a point that should be of great significance for those committed to norms of fairness, justice, or cognate
concepts. What these limits point to, then, is the intellectual and
moral necessity of facing and making difficult choices given constrained and scarce resources; making hard choices is, as the old
saw goes, the essence of governing. The significance of social cost,
once realized, should alert retributivists to the following proposition. Any commitment to fairness or proportionality in matters of
punishment requires a broader understanding of two things: first,
what the magnitude or size of a wrong is; second, how the desirability of addressing that wrong compares against other social needs in
terms of pervasiveness, urgency, or cost.
The skeptic might now argue that the CCR is too capacious,
that it is a rubber stamp under which any decision by the state
could pass as sufficient to serve the goals of retributivism. Explaining why this charge of hollow formalism is false will bring the CCR
into sharper relief. The theory I have outlined requires the occurrence of the retributive confrontation against the possibility of will-

252. See generally FINNIS, supra note 31, at 110 (noting that a coherent life plan, necessary
for human flourishing, would counsel the value of fidelity to certain prior commitments to pursue
one element of the good and that such fidelity preclude pursuing another good that conflicts with
the prior course of action); JOHN RAWIS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). This will have implications for determining when the state has made reasonable efforts to bring someone to justice and
when it may reasonably say it must move on.
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ful passivity. 2 3 Good faith efforts must be made, but what counts as
good faith efforts will be subject to the institutions of a polity to determine. What is most crucial is that the state's retributive activity
be viewed as diminishing the plausibility of a claim to greater liberty under law. This affirmatively rules out any attempt to leave
room for "political mercy" in the form of a blanket amnesty in recovering states, or otherwise in "normal" states. 2 4 By ruling out
blanket amnesties, the CCR sharply contrasts those Kantian re-

tributivist theories that have compared the offender-state relation
to a debtor-creditor relationship, a relation in which sovereign prerogative permits the "creditor" to waive responsibility for collecting
255
the debt in certain ex post situations.
When it comes to the discussion of alternative sanctions,

though, it is less relevant to debate how much the state must expend to discharge its initial prima facie obligation to confront offenders, because the alternative sanctions debate begins after the
determination of culpability. Our real concern then, as we move to
Part IV, where we consider the relationship between retribution
and alternative modes of punishment, is whether the state can be
said to be punishing an offender within its legitimate bounds when
it imposes incarceration in a privately managed prison or applies
various alternative sanctions. In other words, we might now have a
sense of why retribution is justified, but we still need to figure out
what implications exist for prescribing or limiting the ways in
which that practice is enacted. The task of explaining what these

253. In other words, the state is not obligated to prosecute every wrong, but only those
wrongs for which the offenders are known (in the sense that the government would have a good
chance of winning if a trial resulted).
254. Does this mean that I am against cities or states that grant blanket amnesties to all
those who turn in weapons that are illegally obtained or possessed as part of an effort to get guns
off the streets? Yes. That would absolve people of their responsibility. However, a city could offer
to buy guns from any citizens and presume, not entirely unreasonably, that all incoming guns
are from law-abiding citizens.
255. There are a number of good reasons that explain why this analogy is flawed. First, we
have no antecedent obligation to avoid civil debts, in contrast to those that would be punishable
in criminal law. Second, the payment of a debt for criminal action does not compensate the losses
of a victim the way a civil and contractual debt does. That is, civil debts are undertaken on a
voluntary basis, in contrast to the criminal debts paid. Third, civil debts can generally be determined ex ante, whereas there is no equivalently precise calibration available to price the cost of
assault or rape. See MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 138, at 139 n.26. Personhood plays an
important role here as well. The holder of the debt is the state, which has its own interest in
protecting the regime of decisionmaking. But the state shares its interest in the debt with the
public and the victim, and the debt is not one that can be separated into units of fungible currency such that the portion held by the government can be waived while the portion held by the
victim is retained.
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implications are for the alternative sanctions debate is the task of
the next part.
I should say, before closing this part, that we will have good
reason to try to revise some of what has been said on the alleged
dichotomy between the confrontational relation and the social denunciativist relation. But there is a better place for this revision to
appear than right here, so although we have a good idea of what the
CCR is about now, it is by no means wholly enclosed within this
part.
IV. RETRIBUTION AND ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS
Before we examine particular alternative sanctions and their
specific compatibility with the account of retribution discussed
above, let me make a general point about how to justify the inquiry
into alternatives to public prisons. Drawing from the ex ante perspective I alluded to earlier, consider the following rationale. Imagine that we had to decide, not knowing whether we would be victims, offenders, or bystanders, how much society should spend on
the sanctions of retributive justice. The moment we realize that
limitless pursuit of that project would lead to civil conflict, or perhaps less dramatically, would jeopardize our ability to provide care
for the elderly or food and education for the young, that is the moment we realize that choices must be made among competing
worthwhile enterprises. Consider that we make these decisions
through our representatives every year in allocating resources
within state budgets and in establishing guidelines or rules constraining resources used to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate
various wrongs. It seems perfectly justifiable to contemplate and
implement a range of sanctions that could adequately address the
demands of retributive justice at an acceptable social cost. Consideration of these alternatives serves as the point of departure for
this Article.
In the first two sections of this part, I have two tasks: First,
I want to explain, drawing on the CCR, why shaming punishments
are not beautifully retributive. Second, and relatedly, I want to
challenge Professor Whitman's contention that "our familiar liberal
traditions do not give us any persuasive answer" as to why shaming
punishments are not acceptable. 256 In the remainder of the part, I
show that the CCR yields some interesting positions on other devel-

256. Whitman, supra note 21, at 1059.
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opments in the law, specifically: the use of guilt punishments and
privately managed prisons.
A. Why Shaming Punishments Are Not "BeautifullyRetributive"
In Part II, we saw a variety of scholars on both sides of the
debate over shaming punishments who claimed that such punishments were "beautifully retributive." Shaming punishments, recall,
are punishments that rely upon the public castigation of the offender in a way intentionally designed both to express condemnation of the offender and his act, and to do so in a way that humiliates the offender before the public eye. These penalties derive their
effectiveness in moral condemnation from reliance upon communication of moral disgust by the public at large, 257 or what Whitman
calls the crowd, rather than the state. 25 8 Thus shaming punishments, by invoking the aid of the crowd, challenge the idea that it is
only the state that may play a role in the practice of enacting retribution. To the extent this is true, this change in the punishing
agent's identity effects a radically dangerous departure from retribution. The depth of the incompatibility between shaming punishments and retribution can be seen by contrasting retribution with
revenge.
Consider the distinctions that may be drawn between retribution and revenge. 259 First, whereas retribution occurs for legal
wrongs only, revenge is often pursued in response to insults, harms,
and slights. Second, retribution closes cycles of violence, whereas
revenge encourages such cycles through the enduring memory of
hatred and resentment. Third, the scope and intensity of retribution is constrained by law, whereas revenge is not similarly limited.
Fourth, retribution is administered only by those authorized to do
so and follows from a particularized determination about the identity of the offender; revenge, by contrast, occurs at the hands of a
victim or his ally and need not be a result of any determination.

257. See Kahan, supra note 2, at 594.
258. Whitman, supra note 21, at 1059.

259. These distinctions are drawn from NOZICK, supra note 224, at 366-70. Justice Thurgood
Marshall mistakenly suggested that retribution is the idea that punishment is justified in order
to prevent citizens from seeking their own private revenge. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
231-41 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But this is just a straightforward "revenge.
utilitarianism." Margaret Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons:Super Due Process
for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1169-73 (1980). Moreover, Justice Marshall's understanding
gives no prima facie reason to punish offenders but rather only those citizens who seek to punish
the offenders outside the law.
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And finally, the identity of the punisher tends to work a morally
relevant difference in the emotional character of the encounter between punisher and punished. That is, the avenger takes pleasure
in the suffering of the offender, whereas the agent of retribution,
because of his (relative) impartiality, does not exhibit (or is considerably less likely to exhibit) any inappropriate rage or pity; if anything, the agent of retribution may take satisfaction at justice being
enacted. It does not matter to the state's punitive agent who the
offender is (whether it is John or Peter), but it does matter greatly
that the person punished is, in fact, the offender of the wrong (that
John committed this crime). The avenger, in contrast, cares that
John committed the crime if he is avenging John's victim, but he
260
may not care that Peter did the same thing to another person.
The contrasts between retribution and revenge-in particular, the
last three differences-reveal the state's significant role in the enterprise of retribution and its assurance of (relative) impartiality. 26 1
It might fairly be said that retribution and shaming punishments both convey condemnation of the offender's act. But consider:
In what other respects do shaming punishments bear any similarity
to retribution? In fact, shaming punishments bear more resemblance to instances of vengeance than instances of retribution.
How?
First, one might think of vengeance because of the potentially unconstrained scope and intensity of shaming punishments;
they invite the public to perform a role uncomfortably close to lynch
mobs. 262 In this sense, shaming punishments do not allow for retri-

260. It is instructive to go back to Massaro's account and see how she conflates these two
concepts. See supra text accompanying notes 120-121.
261. One might wonder what, if any, similarities exist between retribution and revenge. For
example, is retribution a surrogate or compensation for revenge, an institutionalized revenge or
something different altogether? Historically, the motivation for retribution may have stemmed
from tastes for revenge; however, today the differences are significant enough to work a sharp
break. Retribution is sometimes thought to be motivated by emotions such as hatred or ressentiment, the same emotions that might animate revenge. See MURPHY & HMP'TON, supra note
143, at 88-110 (providing an explanation by Jeffrie Murphy of the retributive hatred thesis). The
account I offer, however, explains that emotions such as hatred or ressentiment are not relevant
to a plausible and attractive theory of retribution; indeed, it is only fidelity to certain principles
of practical reason that motivate the CCR commitments to norms such as moral responsibility
and equality under law.
262. Cf. Whitman, supra note 21, at 1088 ('Who knows how private persons, given the right
to play policemen, will behave.). Whitman's point seems less powerful when two factors are
considered: The crowd is never authorized to play policemen. Moreover, policemen do not inflict
punishment; they investigate crimes, apprehend criminals, and, among other things, engage in
crowd control. But the point still remains: there is an element of disorder that exists with shaming sanctions and that absence of control is antithetical, by its very nature, to a well-ordered
regime. Whitman calls this "at base, a form of officially sponsored lynch justice." Id. Various
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bution to be constrained in the same manner as methods where the
263
state is the exclusive disciplinary force.
Moreover, they are punishments enacted by those who are
not authorized to do so. Might the second point be contested? That
is, could one suggest that when a judge metes out a shaming punishment she is authorizing the viewing public to act as agents of the
state in its role as punisher? Judges are not properly authorized to
make those kinds of decisions, at least not under traditional understandings of the basic idea of agency. Under that traditional understanding, two core features of a principal/agent relationship exist:
first, that the principal can control the agent (relatively speaking),
and, concomitantly, that the principal will bear liability for the
agent's actions performed in the scope of the agent's authority. In
the shaming punishment context, the judge would not be able to
control the citizen who humiliates or scorns the offender because
she does not even know who the mocking citizen will be. One cannot
2
intelligibly render the public at large one's agents. 6
Further, the judge cannot and would not agree that either
the state or she assume liability for various lawless actions that the
shaming citizen(s) might commit. So the invocation of the crowd's
help certainly does not fit into any cognizable notion of responsibility within a principal/agent relationship. That does not mean the
practice of invoking the crowd's aid is an unintelligible practice; it
simply means that it disrupts the notion of the state serving as the
public's agent of retribution when it delegates that power back to
the public at large again.
The advocate of the shaming punishment could respond here
by saying that one's worry of the unconstrained lynch mob could be
addressed by posting a corrections official or police officer near the
offender to make sure that both the offender's physical integrity is
protected and that no one breaks the law in trying to humiliate the
offender. This would obviate the worries of an uncontrollable mob
instances of vigilantism in recent years seem to bear out this concern with respect to shaming
sanctions. Small, supra note 73, at 1451.

263. Whitman, supra note 21, at 1059. Though they may be close in appearance, at least one
obvious difference between shaming punishments and lynch mobs is that lynch mobs are not
enacting a judicially prescribed penalty that results from a putatively fair legal process.
264. One could argue that the judge is only the agent of the people and the agent serves his
role when he impartially adjudicates the guilt of the offender, but that, with shaming punish.
ments, the people reclaim the opportunity to punish and thus narrow the scope of delegation to
the judge. Though there is a certain plausibility to this possible characterization, there are good
reasons that explain why we do not want the public to retain a right to punish (even nonviolently), for much the same reasons that we distinguish between retribution and revenge. See
supra text accompanying note 259.
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and still subject the offender to some humiliation, some degradation
of status, in front of the public, potentially with the aid of the public.
To see why this would still be unattractive from a retributivist viewpoint, we must first recall that retribution's first internal
moral good is that it treats the offenders as agents who possess the
competence to make morally responsible choices. This point puts
forward the notion that the practice of punishment, like all legal
practices, is for the sake of human beings, 26 1 and thus should treat

offenders as moral agents whose personhood itself requires consideration of their dignity as human beings. 266 Because shaming punishments have as their goal the destruction of a person's reputation
and dignity,2 67 the shaming punishment denies the very dignity of
moral agency that the retributive encounter is designed to uphold.
The problem with encouraging public shaming in the first place is
that it makes the offender an instrument of the state; he is being
used (even if indirectly) for display purposes rather than being
treated as someone possessing the basic dignity that attaches to a
268
responsible moral agent.
In order to appreciate further the connection between shaming and vengeance (not retribution), we have to look at the emotional character of the person punishing the offender in the shaming punishment. It is significant that shaming punishments, because they occur in public and rely upon the public, permit victims,
families of victims, and sympathizers to participate in (and perhaps
help orchestrate) the degradation of the offender. Those who shame
others may take personal pleasure in the suffering inflicted on the
offender. The practice of retribution, by contrast, requires that
those who punish have no personal interest in the suffering of the
offender; retribution's impartiality removes the possibility of developing, cultivating, and indulging sadistic impulses in the public
realm. Impartiality in the administration of criminal justice helps

265. See JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES 39 (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod eds., 1987) ('There is little
point in knowing the law if one knows nothing about the persons for whom it exists.").
266. See WHITMAN, supra note 184; cf. John Finnis, The Priority of Persons, in OXTORD
ESSAYS INJURISPRUDENCE 1-15 (4th Series) (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000).
267. See Kahan & Posner, supra note 18, at 365.
268. Might one choose the shaming punishment from the ex ante position? Doubtless, there
are hypotheticals one can imagine (Martians land and say: "Humiliate this person for their crime
or we will incinerate the earth.") where ex ante we would probably choose to be shamed, but
given what we know now about our state of the world, there seems to be little reason to think we
would not choose to effectuate the cluster of ideals enveloping a conception of responsible,
autonomous, and dignity.bearing agents, when there are viable alternatives that do not impose
the same moral costs of degradation.

2220

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 54:2157

ensure adherence to fair procedures, reasonably accurate determinations of guilt for legal offenses, and limited potential for inflicting
(unnecessary) abuse upon an individual. In short, shaming sanctions stray quite far from the requirements of retribution and, instead, look quite a bit more like opportunities for popular revenge.
Two other points put more flesh on the bones of this claim
that shaming sanctions are not "beautifully retributive." The first
point concerns the motivation of the punisher. Recall that earlier
we described the CCR as positing a type of retribution that, when
properly pursued, aims at getting the offender to appreciate at a
cognitive level why he is being punished. We said that the punishment should aim at connecting the offender to an understanding of
lawfulness and give the offender an opportunity to internalize those
lawful values in the life he leads during and after the retributive
encounter. The problem with shaming is that shaming punishments
aim at a kind of reputational homicide. According to Kahan and
Posner, shaming seeks to "destroy" the dignity of the offender. In
doing that, shaming forecloses the opportunity for the offender to be
recognized later on as having the basic dignity that should attach to
a responsible moral agent in the company of other women and men
sharing that moral agency. 269 Thus it violates the intent requirement we discussed earlier.
The second point goes to the effect shaming might have on
those who are active in the shaming process. A society that allows
shame punishments both degrades and potentially harms those involved in punishing the offender. The act of humiliation, bringing
another person down before others, corrupts those endeavors truly
concerned about human flourishing. 270 If this point is accepted, then
shaming sanctions encourage a practice that inevitably coarsens
our sensitivity to the dignity of other persons, and thus, ourselves. 271

269. It might seem that this argument works against the punishment of life imprisonment

without possibility of parole, but prisons are their own communities, and one can imagine that
some prisoners create meaningful lives even within the confines of a penitentiary. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth Kolbert, The Prisoner,NEW YORKER, July 16, 2001, at 44 (narrating the story of Kathy
Boudin, a felon who started a literacy program while she was in prison).
270. See, e.g., AVIsHAi MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY (1996) (describing a political theory
centered around the avoidance of humiliation in its citizenry and social practices); ef. MILTON
STEINBERG, AS A DRIVEN LEAF (1939) (depicting, as a work of historical fiction, the effects of
brutal spectacles on the public under the Roman Empire).
271. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 102 (relying on the psychology literature for this conclusion).

This might seem like a straightforward utilitarian approach to assessing shaming sanctions: it is
true that we are looking at the effects (corrosion of sensitivity) of a given practice (shaming) on a
particular group of individuals (the public shamers), but the process is different in that we do not
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This type of negative effect would then run up against the
very maxim undergirding retributivism: namely, that competent
individuals bear responsibility for their actions. This maxim, of
course, applies not only to offenders but also to government officials, policymakers, and the citizens of a democratic polity.
Before moving forward any further, it might be useful to reconsider the path we have followed and ask what revisions might be
made to what has been said. Our initial suspicion towards shaming
was similar to Whitman's, in that it improperly invited the public to
participate in mob justice, and therefore encroached upon the
state's monopoly on punishment. But this reason alone was a red
herring, because we could imagine a world where the state still legislated, adjudicated, controlled the administration of shaming punishments, and avoided the risk of mob justice, merely by posting
guards and policemen around the shamed offenders. This reduced
the pungency of the whiff of mob violence. But more importantly, it
still permitted the retention of the essential features of the shaming punishment: namely, the crafting of a punishment that aimed
at degrading the offender, destroying his reputation, and having
that degradation occur before the public eye, with the nonviolent
participation of the people.
Forced to reconsider, we noted three things that create conflict between retribution and shaming: first, shaming fails to take
seriously the dignity-bearing nature of a morally autonomous citizen within a good and decent polity; second, shaming violates the
intent requirement of all punishments by aiming at the destruction
of someone's ability to interact as an equal citizen once the retributive confrontation ends; and finally, shaming relies upon and cultivates the wrong emotional dispositions in the people engaged in
punishing.
These points raise a vitally important question: Could we
envision a practice of punishment that blurred the line between the
confrontational relationship and the social denunciativist relationship without yielding these violations of the retributive framework?
I think the answer is yes. 27 2 As I have suggested earlier, the
confrontational relationship is not imperialistic. That fact creates
space between, on the one hand, making punishment only between
the state and the criminal, and, on the other hand, allowing unca-

think it necessary to measure the quanta of the effects. We assume them to be real, in the same
way that we assume that punishment of offenses effectuates equal liberty under law.
272. And I am very grateful to Michael Blake's comments for explaining why. His thoughts
are incorporated in the next two paragraphs in the text.
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nalized public recrimination to flood into the world of criminal law.
Earlier I noted that retribution is justified not simply because the
criminal has arrogated too much political power, but also because
the criminal has claimed powers over others in civil society that the
complying individuals have renounced. This would make the wrong
not just one against the state, but against other people in society.
The state is involved, since the state's role is to ensure a functioning civil society, but so might the members of civil society. It strikes
me that, on this account, we could acknowledge some role of citizens
without making our theory of retribution rest on their hatred or
mob violence.
In other words, we might imagine that citizens legitimately
desire seeing the legal norms of the state vindicated, not in seeing
another person humiliated-the goal is not to increase happiness by
satisfying their bloodlust. This would make the problems identified
with the denunciation conception-its unguided search for narratives of pain-less problematic. It is possible to see a world in which
the public took seriously the rules of civil society, and took seriously
its reactions to those who violated them. Then, they do not regard
those who are being exposed for their crimes as mere vehicles for
gleeful cruelty, but as participants in a solemn practice designed to
expiate a wrong. (Imagine something like shunning here-in which
there is a duty on the part of all to play a certain defined role in the
execution of the punishment.) This sort of punishment, it seems,
might escape many of the criticisms raised before. In particular, it
would reduce the fear of the unconstrained lynch mob. It would be
no more degrading to society than incarceration. And without some
more evidence to the contrary, this would probably be no more degrading to the criminal than incarceration already is. However, this
qualified support could be mustered only if there were what John
Braithwaite calls "reintegrative ceremonies" at the end of the retributive encounter. 273 As it stands, what I have just described as a
possibility lies far afield from the types of actual shaming punishments discussed in Part I, and thus, the main argument still seems
to me to ring true.
B. Why Shaming Sanctions Are Illiberal
Although the focus of this Article is on the incompatibility
between shaming and retribution, it seems worthwhile to show the

273. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 23, at 107.
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problems that shaming poses to those committed to liberalism. In
his critique of shaming punishments, Yale Law School Professor
James Whitman has suggested that there is no idea particular to
liberalism that leads one to reject shaming punishments. He argues
that from the viewpoint of the "great liberal tradition," there is
nothing particularly disconcerting about shaming sanctions. 274
While I agree as a general policy matter with Whitman's eloquent
critique of shaming punishments, I think he makes two mistakes
here: The first one I have just discussed, namely, his claim, in
summarizing the views of others, that, shaming punishments are
"beautifully retributive." The second is this claim that liberalism is
indifferent to shaming punishments. Perhaps those who identify
not as retributivists, but as liberals, will be curious to see how
Whitman's second claim can be contested.
Whitman finds that the main contemporary danger of shaming punishments is to the stable ordering of society by the state and
that this concern for protecting order from the unpredictable political energy of the people is not uniquely liberal, for even kindly
monarchs or tyrants have interests in holding on tight to the reins
of power.
And yet, perhaps unwittingly, Professor Whitman canvasses
a variety of historical sources that suggest precisely some of the
ways liberalism would be hostile to shaming punishments. For example, he begins his argument by first explaining the various motivations behind the move against shaming punishments in the
Enlightenment period. He observes that the early opponents of
shaming punishments were often involved in a larger project to
eradicate status differences through the particular mode of punishment chosen. What this larger project denotes is a concern for
ensuring that the law does not appear to favor any one (type of) individual over another (type). Once the revolution's egalitarianism
took hold, the guillotine, for example, was used for all capital punishments in France, whereas previously noblemen had been beheaded and commoners hanged.2

75

Oddly, Whitman sees this flat-

274. Whitman, supra note 21, at 1063. In conversations subsequent to the publication of his
article, Professor Whitman accepted the possibility that current strands of liberalism may exist
that indicate an incompatibility between shaming and liberalism. Nonetheless, he did not think
that the liberalism of that time required that incompatibility. While this is a helpful qualification, I still think the liberal tradition of that time encompassed thinkers whose writings would
deny the compatibility between shame and liberalism, such as Locke or Kant. It would be a mistake to rely exclusively on reformers like Bentham and Beccaria to establish the parameters for
the "liberal tradition." Cf Peter Berkowitz, Ethicism, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 5, 2001, at 40, 43-44
(decrying the canard that liberalism does not have a public good envisioned by its tradition).
275. Whitman, supra note 21, at 1070.
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tening of legal hierarchy as having little to do with liberalism. This
seems peculiar given that even the most Millian version of liberalism-a society guided by the harm principle and not much
else-presupposes an insistence that all persons of majority age and
competence have the same political and civil rights under the law
and that the law ought not give effect to different social statuses.
Whitman then observes that the social reformers of the
Enlightenment period feared the corrosive effects shaming punishments would work on the offender, as well as the agents of the state
and the public at large. Hobhouse, for instance, thought shaming
rendered the offender subhuman, making him an example of "sensuality [and] ferocity" to the public. 276 Thackeray noted his own
sense of deep unease when "brutal curiosity" would draw him to
public executions. 77 Cruelty in punishment, they said, is "born of
cruelty in the mores of society," and it thus "makes those mores yet
more brutal in turn ....
This is all the more true if indecency is
mingled with the punishment in question, if the victim becomes the
plaything of the populace ..
,"278 This set of concerns, it seems to
me, appears to be fundamentally a part of the Kantian strand of
liberalism that envisions each citizen as a dignity-bearing and ra279
tionally autonomous moral agent.
It seems then that Whitman bases his conclusion that liberalism is indifferent to shaming only on the fact that a few liberals of
the utilitarian stripe had this view. In particular, he cites both Bentham and Beccaria as viewing shaming "as an indispensable punishment device." 280 Bentham endorsed various other kinds of shaming sanctions as replacements for the pillory, 28 1 while Beccaria
282
stood in favor of forced public labor.
For Whitman, though, the dignity-focused arguments
against shaming "no longer seem to carry weight," or at least not
for our age. 2 83 He writes that "[w]e have lost too much of the sense

276. L.T. HOBHOUSE, MORALS IN EVOLUTION 114 (1908).
277. William Thackeray, Going to See a Man Hanged, 22 FRASER'S MAO. FOR TOWN &
COUNTRY 150, 158 (1840).
278. J. Tissot, INTRODUCTION HISTORIQUE A L'ETUDE DU DROIT 100 (Paris, Librairie do Ma.
rescq Ain6 1875).
279. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
(Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998).
280. Whitman, supra note 21, at 1071 & n.80.
281. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 347-50 (C.K. Ogden ed., Harcourt,
Brace & Co. 1931) (1802).
282. See BECCARIA, supra note 174, at 54-55.
283. Whitman, supra note 21, at 1082.
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that shaming others is not a decent way to act."M As a result, the
arguments against shaming today draw their power from what he
calls the "statist-authoritarian" argument: "Exposing offenders to
the public .. is likely to excite the crowd so much that it causes
rioting, and when there is rioting, the state loses control."213 According to Whitman, there is nothing particularly liberal about this concern.286
Whitman still thinks the statist argument, concerning worries over crowd control, has "a kernel of truth in it."287 For example,

various courts and commentators expressed concerns over "harassment" of released offenders with respect to sexual predator notification statutes, like Megan's Law. This is what creates the image of
"state-encouraged lynch justice" that Whitman conjures up, an
"ochlocracy" too vulnerable to the "pitch and yaw of mob psychology."2 9 Of course, as should be clear from the prior section, lynch
mobs, whether state encouraged or not, hardly enact (retributive)
0
justice. 29
Only in his conclusion does Whitman begin to suggest that
liberal democracies possess an abiding and uniquely proper interest
in the rule of law, a rule of law "that denies our officials the authority to pluck on the bass strings of public psychology and that makes
criminal law the province of trained and disciplined officers," offi-

284. Id.
285. Id. at 1083.
286. Whitman does note one other liberal argument against shaming. He suggests that the

classical liberals believed that although shame was an effective tool of sanctioning behavior, it
was a tool that should be used by society, and not the state. On this view, the "state could never
order members of society to regard private persons either with respect or contempt, for public
opinion formed its own judgments about the merit of private persons, judgments over which the
state could not have the slightest influence." Id. at 1086. This empirical speculation of course has
not been vindicated by history. Inthe aftermath of successful propaganda campaigns and the use
of the mass media by democratic leaders and contenders, however, the idea that the government
cannot influence public opinion seems positively quaint-and wrong. Id. at 1086-87. He writes
that "[it]
is hard ... to believe that the state cannot succeed in stirring up the passions of the
crowd against individuals.... Does anyone really doubt that our own shame sanctions, whether
directed against sex offenders or drunk drivers, have some impact on 'public opinion' about that
person?" Id. at 1088.
287. Id.

288. See, e.g., E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1082-90 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing New Jersey's Megan's law); Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between
Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L REV. 1, 39.42 (1991) (observing
danger of private violence resulting from certain disclosure rules); Whitman, supra note 21, at
1089 n.7.
289. Whitman, supra note 21, at 1089.
290. Perhaps Richard Parker and other populists would disagree here, and nonetheless support community-based penal initiatives. See generally RICHARD D. PARKER, 'HERE, THE PEOPLE
R"
(1994).
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cers operating under an "ethic of restraint and sobriety." 29 1 That
this remark comes so late in the essay is surprising.
To my mind, the liberal ethos of restraint and sobriety generates two related critiques of shaming sanctions, both of which
Whitman overlooks. The first critique suggests that liberals may
properly be concerned with inculcating the appropriate virtues for
participation in a vibrant liberal democracy.
On this view, liberalism needs to care for the virtue of its
citizens, and therefore its politics must reflect that need accordingly. The skeptic might ask: Which virtues though? Is it possible
for the state to undertake this task without stepping on the toes of
citizens who hold different views and values? The answer is yes, the
state can do so, but only if we view the moral psychology of the liberal regime in a deeper way than Whitman's assessment.
The liberal way of life requires an education of citizens that
appreciates the importance and order of individual freedom, moral
responsibility, and respect for the procedures that guarantee a wellordered polity. This is a point increasingly emphasized in recent
contemporary political theory. Drawing upon moderns such as
Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and Mill, Peter Berkowitz interprets and
commends the liberal way of life as an achievement that "demands
of individuals specific virtues or, to speak less formally, certain
qualities of mind and character-such as reflective judgment, sympathetic imagination, self-restraint, the ability to cooperate, and
toleration-that do not arise spontaneously but require education
and cultivation." 292 Berkowitz is hardly alone.
In Stephen Macedo's words, liberalism is more than just "a
set of negative mechanisms for limiting and controlling political
power." 293 It admits of a "positive means for fostering a politics worthy of esteem. This is the case not only because liberal politics protects basic liberties, but also because it fosters a political community united by basic principles and by a commitment to criticizing,
debating, and refining those principles in public." 294 The commitment to education and cultivation for a liberal way of life finds itself represented, I suggest, in our social practice. If we were truly

291. Whitman, supra note 21, at 1092.
292. PETER BERKOWITZ, VIRTUE AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM, at xi (1999). But
cf. PARKER, supra note 290, at 65-115 (urging constitutional theory afficionados to be less leery of
the energy of the people, whether in crowds or assemblies).
293. Stephen Macedo, In Defense of Liberal Public Reason, in NATURAL LAW AND PUBLIC
REASON 14 (2000).
294. Id.
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neutrality-type liberals, would we not be forced to end the support
from the public fisc for schools, museums, and parks?2 5 A fervid
commitment to state neutrality with respect to our moral lives
would upend the "sense of justice" that John Rawls himself argues
is vital for citizens in order to maintain a scheme of fair cooperation
over generations. Though this vision of liberalism may appear thoroughly non-Dworkinian, 296 it has hardly been an obscure or marginalized viewpoint, as both Joseph Raz2 7 and others298 have written
extensively in advocacy of this view.
The second point concerns one liberal virtue in particular:
modesty about one's intellectual and moral claims. Modesty, for the
good liberal, need not engender self-abasing behavior, but merely
self-critical and self-correcting behavior. In that vein, consider the
following: on the view of liberalism described and endorsed in the
previous two paragraphs, a good liberal is someone who exhibits the
character dispositions of judiciousness, open-mindedness, and sympathetic imagination. That is why we adopt procedures that make
all sides think that they have a chance to use reason to persuade
the decisionmaker of their side of the story. That is why our judicial
decisions follow the norm of explaining to the losing parties in a
case why they lost. And that is also why we publish dissents along
with the majority opinions. These norms reflect a commitment to
reconsideration of similar cases over time (or in the future life of
the same case through direct or collateral review). Pace Whitman,
these norms evolve as part of the liberal ethic not only of restraint
and sobriety, but also modesty: an awareness of our fallibility, an
awareness of the fragility of our judgments,299 and an awareness of
the contingent circumstances that might place one person under the
scrutiny of the legal system rather than another. 300 As good liberals

295. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, The State's Interest in Retribution, 1994 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 283, 294.
296. See RONALD M. DWORKIN, A MATrTER OF PRINCIPLE 335 (1985) (developing the liberal

neutrality thesis through discussion of a strong right to "moral independence").
297. See generally JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
298. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSiTY IN THE

LIBERAL STATE (1991) (criticizing Dworkin's neutrality thesis of liberalism).
299. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Cognitive and Moral Obstacles to Imputation, in CHARACTER,
LIBERTY AND LAW (1998).
300. This is not to discount a liberal's or retributivist's commitment to moral agency and responsibility, but to suggest that life is not fully within our control Richard Rorty gives a powerful performance of the liberal imagination when he points out the contingency of some of our
moral outlooks. See RICHARD RORTY, On Heidegger'sNazism, in PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE

190 (1999). There, he counters the critics of Heidegger, who say his Nazism was essential to his
philosophical outlook, by suggesting a plausible world in which Heidegger falls in love with a
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then, our punishment practices should be tempered-but not paralyzed-by this awareness of our imperfection. Embracing the practice of intentional degradation of another person before the public
and with the public's aid runs afoul of this awareness, and renders
shaming punishments incompatible with the liberal virtues discussed above.
Can the same point about modesty be made, not only for liberalism, but also retributivism? I should hope so. Recall from Part
III that the CCR is a mode of discourse that, by taking criminal actions seriously, affirms the moral agency of the offender. If the CCR
is followed properly, the use of state power for punitive purposes is
not an undignified use, but a quietly ennobling one. If state power
is used capriciously or sadistically, the agents bearing that power
act without legitimacy, for they transgress the bounded use of
power that chartered their use of coercive power over another citizen. What this means is that if retributivists are committed to interpreting the practice of punishment as a dignified use of coercion,
then one should ensure that the ascription of moral responsibility
for a crime to another person must be accompanied by the correct
posture. A posture of overweening confidence, such as would be required for the use of the death penalty or shaming sanctions, is inappropriate for retributivists to assume. For although retributivists
affirm the notion of moral agency, they also recognize that one cannot understand all that surrounds us with acuity and insight.
If what I have said seems plausible, then a just political order cannot be viewed merely as the coordination that permits the
aggregation of preference satisfactions. Rather, society's authorized
penal institutions must comport its practices to the limits that
practical reason imposes, not because these ideas or ideals should
be privileged above human flourishing, but because, absent supreme emergencies, reflection upon and compliance with practical
reason help constitute that notion of human flourishing. 01 Viewed
against this backdrop, shaming punishments are inconceivable because they exhibit none of the features necessary to create a "political community united by basic principles" of decency and dignity.30 2
As such, they destroy the respect for others that help make a polity
worth living in and for.

Jewish student and escapes during the war to University of Chicago, only to return later to Gormany as an anti-egalitarian agrarian with good anti-Nazi credentials. See id. at 193-95.
301. See NozIcK, supra note 8, at 2-12 (describing the functional role principles play in improving human life).
302. Macedo, supra note 293.
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-C. The CCR and Guilt Punishments
In the argument so far, I have tried to show why shaming
punishments are incompatible with both retributivism and liberalism. It would seem unfortunate, however, if people viewed retributivism as a rearguard movement against developing alternative
sanctions to public prisons. Consequently, I want to suggest how
certain kinds of alternative sanctions are consistent with the account expressed here. Let us begin with guilt punishments.
Recall the distinction between guilt and shame punishments
offered earlier. Whereas shaming punishments have the goal of degrading offenders for their wrongs, and of doing so in public and
with public participation, guilt punishments are structured to induce a kind of contrition for one's wrongdoing without the intentional debasement or publicity that attends shame punishments.
This contrition would arguably be desirable under any theory of
punishment, but retributivism is notably concerned about the moral
character of the offender, and therefore takes contrftion particu303
larly seriously.
Some popular examples illustrate how guilt punishments
might work. A rapist or pederast may be punished, not only with a
period of incarceration, but also with exposure to documentaries
depicting how victims of rape or child molestation have been traumatized by such actions. Slumlords who violate the housing codes of
a city may be sentenced to house arrest in one of their tenements
for a period of time.304 If someone's recklessness blinded a victim in
one eye, the criminal could be sentenced to wear an eyepatch for a
period of time, to bring home the effect of having blinded a victim in
one eye. The public would not have to know that his wearing an
eyepatch was a state-imposed punishment, but the offender would.
Similarly, those who attack interracial couples could be required to
view civil rights movies.30 5
What these punishments have in common is that their effectiveness depends in a subtle way upon a reconfigured notion of lex
talionis (LT). This reconfigured lex talionis "recommends the infliction of hardship on an offender that 'mirrors' his own wrongdo-

303. But see Garvey, supra note 1, at 1835 (lamenting that "retribution gives us punishment
without atonement"). Atonement is ultimately, I believe, a matter of private conscience, and thus
it is not something the state can reliably elicit. Cf. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 43 (Richard

Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1651). On the other hand, it is something that the state
can encourage through practices such as those described in the next paragraph in the text.
304. See, e.g., Instead of Jail, supranote 93.
305. See, e.g., Man Sentenced to See "MississippiBurning," supra note 95.
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What LT punishments do is help "reflect back on the

offender what he has done to his victim. ' 307 Some have suggested
that LT is deemed obligatory in some way for retribution. 08 But to
insist on LT requires someone to give reasons for its use, since it is
not otherwise self-evident. What reasons might there be? As
Stephen Garvey proposes, a (guilt) LT punishment " 'mirrors' [the
criminal's] own wrongdoing in order to morally 'educate' him, to
make him see the error of his ways, and ideally, to lead him to repentance." 30 9 Of course, one can imagine punishments that are not
drawn from LT that might still be morally educative. And conversely, there might be LT-type punishments that are not always
morally educative, such as the death penalty. Nonetheless, something about LT might be instructive.
As Jeremy Waldron notes, lex talionis need not (and, often,
should not) be a true mirror. Rather, we "expect the punishment
demanded by LT to share some of the features of the original offense and not others."3 10 What makes LT an attractive principle for
Waldron is that it works a type of educative reciprocity; that said,
we need to be careful about which features we select to highlight in
the penal response to the wrongdoing. As a general matter, "we
should identify the relevant act-type at the level of generality that
indicates exactly the features that make the action wrong."3 11 On
this scheme, someone who kills need not be killed, but might instead be deprived of the ability consciously to self-direct her life. 312
Similarly, someone who commits fraud, and thus endangers the
stability of representations in the marketplace, might be subjected
to serving time in prison in an unpredictable and occasionally lastminute manner, so as to drive home the message of what it means
to have reliance interests capriciously ruptured. 313
Of course, in its crude form the lex talionis appears to be of
little use when there are no apparent victims, or when the criminal

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Garvey, supra note 2, at 739.
Id.
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3.
Garvey, supra note 2, at 739.
Waldron, supra note 97, at 32-33.
Id. at 35.
See id. at 36.
I am not suggesting that these should be the only elements of the punishment the state

inflicts. It could be that fines and imprisonment supplement this LT variation. As I have indi.
cated elsewhere in this Article, one should choose the sentencing, like all the policy choices, from
an ex ante viewpoint, and thus incorporate all the relevant information and norms that one
deems relevant and attractive in fashioning a good and decent polity. I am only illustrating ways
in which we can reimagine punishment to effectuate some of the norms we think have purchase.
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act itself is so degrading that the state could not ask its employees
to practice the "mirror" image of the crime on the offender. 314 But
there are ways of using the lex talionis to punish criminals without
aiming at their humiliation. And of course, there can be guilt punishments that do not necessarily have an LT component that are
still contrition inducing-these too would be consistent with the
CCR. Which guilt punishments we pick should presumably be subjected to rational scrutiny and democratic deliberation.
Unlike shaming, which requires an audience, these guilt
punishments can be applied in (relative) solitude-they do not
communicate to a wide audience that this offender is of a bad type,
to be avoided or scorned. And while these punishments will not
wipe out the wrong or change the past, they achieve the internal
goals of retribution, such as, to use Robert Nozick's phrase, repairing "the disconnection with value" that the crime represented. 3 15 In
this important way, they affirm the moral agency of the offender.
One of the organizing and distinctive themes of the CCR is
that the CCR does not make a claim for exclusive control over what
considerations may properly shape a state-administered punishment. Although the CCR does foreclose certain types of punishment, like shaming, it does not require the application of imaginative guilt punishments to supplant incarceration and/or restitution.
Rather, it only permits, and indeed may support, these alternative
sanctions.
What is it about guilt punishments that the CCR may commend? For one thing, these alternative sanctions reflect the underlying justificatory principles of retribution more effectively. By requiring the offender of a hate crime to sense the toxicity of hatred
through his punishment experience (by seeing the pain of others
dramatized or documented), the state might be better able to convey its commitment to the principle of equal liberty under the law.
And it does so in a way that "ordinary" incarceration (alone) may
not do as well. This is not to say that incarceration ought to be
abandoned-it may well be the most widely accepted way to deny
the offender's claims to superiority and achieve other legitimate
goals. The point here is only to show that, because efficient allocation of scarce public resources is a legitimate concern, we may le-

314. One of the many virtues of Waldron's pellucid essay is explaining with great analytic
clarity how the lex talionis can be used in cases like forgery, where there is no obvious victim, or
like rape, where the brutality of the crime is not one we want state officials to visit upon the
offender. See Waldron, supranote 97.
315. NOZICK, supra note 224, at 379.
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gitimately look to noncarceral punishments that still serve the
goals of retribution. Reasonable legislators should consider an array of interests so long as those interests do not themselves violate
the guiding principles described earlier.
In sum, the choice of state legislators and judges to apply
guilt punishments as an alternative sanction remains a choice. And
as a choice, it must be scrutinized, debated, implemented, and revised through the appropriate democratic institutions that help articulate which punishments are appropriate for which crimes.316
D. The CCR and PrivatePrisons
In the previous section we saw how retributivism supports
some alternatives or supplements to incarceration in a publicly
managed prison. In this section I argue that, although private prisons would at first glance appear to run contrary to the principles of
retribution described in Part III, they may under certain circumstances be compatible with those principles and, as such, a defensible development in penal practice.
As mentioned at the outset of this Article, one recent development in American penal strategies has been to privatize prison
services. 3 17 Three causes lie at the root of this development. The
first two causes are the endemic problem of overcrowding in public
prisons and the resulting perception that public authorities have
failed to deal with that problem in an effective and expeditious
manner.3 18 The third factor is the surge in costs for incarcerating
such a large population; legislators and budget analysts are there-

316. Those who reject certain positive laws that we have will obviously be less enthused
about at least one of the goods achieved internal to the practice of retribution, namely, the pro-

tection of the decisionmaking regime that spawned these "disagreeable" positive laws. But their

dissatisfaction with that regime occurs ex post, not ex ante. Pointing this out does not necessar-

ily mollify the critics, but they might come to agree at one higher level of abstraction that the
government may permissibly enforce laws that result from procedures they would have reasonably chosen beforehand. Moreover, the critics of a given law, such as a prohibition on consensual
sodomy, will have a problem not with retribution per se, but with any discomfort that might be
brought to bear upon them, regardless of the guiding principles of punishment operating.
317. See Fox Butterfield, For PrivatelyRun Prisons, New Evidence of Success, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 19, 1995, at A7 (noting that corrections officials around the country are paying greater

attention to the use of private prisons). In truth, private prisons are nothing new in America. See
supraPart I.B.
318. See Lisa Belkin, The Rise of PrivatePrisons:How Much of a Bargain?,N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
27, 1989, at A14 (attributing rise of private prison services to overcrowding); John J. Dilulio, Jr.,
What's Wrong with Private Prisons, PUB. INT., Summer 1988, at 66-67 (observing increases in
recidivism and overcrowding as instigations of the privatization movement).
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fore excited to see the possibility of reducing the costs of incarcera319
tion through the use of the marketplace.
A fierce debate now exists over the ethical propriety and the
economic prudence of private prisons.3 20 Most proponents of private
prisons point to the benefits of private prisons, highlighting that
the outcomes in private prisons on issues such as cost savings, inmate safety, and the quality of prison conditions are equivalent to
321
or better than those in publicly administered facilities.
Opponents of private prisons respond by taking one or more
of three possible tacks. First, they might point out that the cost savings are misleading because accounting procedures differ. 322 These
critics note the hidden costs of private prisons that governments
may be required to absorb, costs such as monitoring compliance
with constitutional or other statutory requirements. 32 Other critics
observe that the private prison companies are engaged in the practice of "creaming" the prison industry: that is, they "have largely
confined themselves to managing smaller, lower-security institutions and have yet to tackle any of the big maximum security prisons that require more staffing and are therefore more expensive to
run."324
Finally, the opponent might, instead of questioning private
prison proponents' empirical findings, challenge the enterprise of
private prisons on normative grounds. That is, rather than contest
the effects or outcomes claimed by the proponents, certain "expressivist" opponents, such as Michael Walzer, regard private prison

319. See DiIulio, supra note 318, at 68. Some studies of private incarceration indicate that
savings, from the moderate to the dramatic, can be gained. See Wayne H. Calabrese, Low Cost,

High Quality, Good Fit. Why Not Privatization?,in PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTuTurIOlS
175, 177 (Gary NV. Bowman et al. eds., 1993); Nzong Xiong, Private Prisons:A Question of Savings, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1995, at C5 (noting that a study of Louisiana prisons found private

prisons saved, on average, ten to twenty percent off the per diem cost of maintaining state-run
facilities).
320. See, e.g., RICHARD NV. HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY (1997);
CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PROS (1990); Calabrese, supra note 319;
Sharon Dolovich, The Ethics of Private Prisons (Nov. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, draft on
file with author).
321. See Butterfield, supra note 317 (reporting that inmates of private prisons who have a
basis for comparison prefer private prisons).
322. See Xiong, supra note 319 (describing a Government Accounting Office paper stating

that it would be impossible to derive, on the basis of a survey of various studies, the conclusion
that prison privatization is more economical).
323. See McKnight v. Rees, 88 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that profit.seeking firms

may wish to "[cut] corners on constitutional guarantees").
324. Butterfield, supra note 317 (summarizing one of Professor DiIulio's criticisms).
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services as abhorrent to values they cherish 3 26-even if great savings in cost and an equivalency in matters such as the "effective326
ness and efficiency" of private prisons could be realized.
Different reasons are offered for this normative opposition.
First, one might view the use of private prisons as expressing a
message of the state's indifference to the offense. On this view, using private prisons may appear to commodify inmates in a manner
antithetical to a state's duty to respect the dignity of its citizens,
even those who have been incarcerated. 327 Another concern is that

the use of private prisons permits the "state to offload custodial responsibility for convicted offenders to institutions only derivatively
committed to the values and obligations of the ethical liberal polity,
thus itself constituting a violation of those values and obligations."3 28
Indifference, commodification, offloading responsibilitythese are things good people presumably do not endorse. Nonetheless, there is something of a conclusory air about them. What I
want to suggest here in this section is that the CCR, which may at
first appear to bolster these arguments against private prisons, in
the end generates certain complications-the effects of which are to
put the question of private prisons back on the table as a reasonable possibility for policy design.
What might the CCR argument against private prisons look
like? First, one would observe that the CCR requires a reasonably
effective communication by the state to the offender and that this
communication aims to convey the rejection of the offender's claims
to superiority. With private prisons, the retributive response to the
criminal appears to be made by the prison guard and his private
employer, not the state. If it is not the state denying the claim of
superiority, then it is manifestly not a CCR-type encounter, since it
appears to be a communication occurring by private hands. This
would seem, at first blush, to deny offenders, and other citizens,
325. See Michael Walzer, At McPrison and Burglar King, It's... Hold the Justice, NEW

REPUBLIC, Apr. 8, 1985, at 10, 10 (noting that "economic arguments cannot be the crucial ones"
in assessing private prisons).
326. Cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 767 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Honoring the presumption of innocence is often difficult; sometimes we must pay substantial social
costs as a result of our commitment to the values we espouse. But at the end of the day the pro.

sumption of innocence protects the innocent; the shortcuts we take with those whom we believe
to be guilty injure only those wrongfully accused and, ultimately, ourselves.").
327. Walzer, supra note 325, at 10-12 (arguing that what is wrong with the private prison is
that it exposes "the prisoners to private or corporate purposes, and it sets them at some distance
from the protection of the law").
328. Dolovich, supranote 320, at 11.
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their entitlement to reasonable evidence to think that it is the state
after all that is fulfilling its prima facie duty to punish.
A second potential CCR claim against private prisons would
highlight the appearance that punishment is occurring without the
appropriate emotional disposition: namely, impartial detachment
that nonetheless recognizes the humanity of the punished. The concern would be that a prison guard's sense of impartiality would be
undermined when he is employed by a prison-services corporation
whose goal is profit, and therefore not essentially committed to the
project of retributive justice. The hidden premise of this claim,
though, is that publicly employed prison guards have different and
3
nobler motivations in performing their jobs. 2
Impartiality is crucial on the OCR's view. Surely, it would be
a mistake for determinations of admission to, and release from,
prison, for example, to be made by those who do not wear the robes
of the state. Ultimate authority for these tasks, along with the determination of what kind of confinement conditions the prisoners
should experience, should remain firmly in the hands of public officials. But it is hard to say why, on the other hand, ministerial or
administrative functions may not be delegated to others so long as
the government retains final control over all meaningful matters
affecting the life of a prisoner.
Perhaps this point can be clarified with reference to a continuum of control and power exercised by the liberal state over
prison services. That control can be and is often determined by contracts, the basis of which are guidelines established by the relevant
legislatures. Once control is viewed along a continuum, it becomes
difficult to insist that the line must be drawn in one place rather
than another.
To illustrate: it would presumably be acceptable to have a
state receive bids from private contractors to build a government
office building, hospital, school, or prison. Once the building is
standing, we might also agree that at least certain goods and services from the private sector may be procured, with a variety of
criteria in mind: durability, price, quality, etc. It probably does not
bother us that Marriott Corporation provides the food and perhaps
the linen service for state-run institutions such as prisons, asylums,
nursing homes, hospitals, etc. (If it did bother us, we'd be in trouble: Would it mean that buying Coca-Cola instead of making one's
own fizzy beverages was verboten for these institutions?) It cer329. Accounts of prison guards in public prisons throw significant doubts on this suggestion.
See CONOVER, supranote 105.
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tainly would not raise eyebrows if health, religious, and education
services to prisoners were provided by contractors or volunteers
rather than those on the government payroll. Furthermore, if the
prison guards and staff were unionized, and affiliated with unions
also operating outside the prison context, then that too would be
presumably be uncontroversial.
If health, religious, and educative needs can be provided by
nonemployees of the state, then why not their safety (and to be
sure, disciplinary) needs? Here the question is whether the prison
guards must receive their training and paychecks directly from the
state, or whether an outside source is (morally) permissible. The
concerns boil down to two related issues: control and liability. The
consumers of private prison services are the state and federal governments. There are many suppliers, presumably interested in satisfying the benchmarks or criteria that the consumers of these services desire. To the extent they are able to, they will charge the efficient price for their services. If the governments insist on certain
assurances (no beating the prisoners), the suppliers will have incentive to comply, since failure to do so would cost them the contract. 330 The government could insist that the suppliers carry adequate insurance for torts inflicted upon prisoners, as one example.
The cost of that is then passed on to the government as the price of
compliance with constitutional norms. And under the "traditional
government function" test of the state action doctrine, the expectation of compliance with constitutional norms would extend to private prison-services companies.
What this shows then is that there is a continuum between,
at one end, a bunch of thugs getting kicks in on the criminal in an
alley outside the courthouse and, at the other end, the controlled
near-Panopticon environment in a maximum security prison run by
state-employed prison guards. The question is how far we may
move in the direction toward the thugs exercising vigilantism.
That question invites a nice comparison between private
prisons and shaming punishment. One might be tempted to think
that a private company authorized to use coercive measures is too
close to the crowd. But to do so risks overlooking two important
points.

330. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997) (holding that private prison guards
are disciplined by the marketplace and therefore do not require qualified immunity under that
doctrine's historical purposes).
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The first is the difference between the control that is bargained for by the state in its contracts with private prison corporations, and the relative lack of control when shaming punishments
are applied, or at least as they have been applied. 331 (Keep in mind
that the control exercised by the state goes beyond merely enunciating various guidelines at the outset. The control can be exercised
through a range of intermediate and ex post measures, such as
damages or constant consultations and revisions of the guidelines.)
Ultimately this point about state control of the retributive
response is about assuring due process to individuals. We do not
want a situation where public power is being used for private purposes. Due process protects against that misuse. But there seems
little reason to believe that when contracts include due process
safeguards (including a right to have certain confinement decisions
subject to independent review and appeal), the prisoner in the socalled private prison will necessarily be in a more precarious position. Indeed some have argued that as some of the administrative
power moves to private prison corporations courts will decrease
their traditional deference to prison officials. 332 This is in part because decisions made by a contractor are reviewable "by a government monitor as well as subject to challenge in court," thus creating
"another layer of independent review." 333 Contracting to private
firms, in other words, can create an extra layer of impartiality that
facilitates the provision of due process. Recognizing this possibility,
some states have placed an ombudsman's office of a prison or other
institution in the ambit of a private organization, precisely to moni334
tor the state's organs of coercion.

331. One might suggest the possibility of contracting out the shaming experience to shaming
services corporations under strict contracts like the ones for which I offer qualified support for in
the text. Assuming arguendo that shame could be privatized for this thought experiment, I

would still not be satisfied, despite the pacification of my concerns about control and liability,
since the shaming punishments are penalties of humiliation. The problem with state authorized

contracts for the services of humiliation is that in seeking to destroy the reputation and selfworth of a person, as Kahan and Posner advocate, the state is acting (or permitting someone to

act in its name) in a way that runs afoul of the notions that modesty should attach to one's mode
of punishment and that the state should treat prisoners as dignity.bearing individuals capable of
moral agency.

332. See David N. Wecht, Note, Breaking the Code of Deference: JudicialReview of Private
Prisons,96 YALE L.J. 815 (1987).
333. LOGAN, supra note 320, at 65.
334. Id. at 66. It bears mentioning, of course, that a lot of these arguments are dependent
upon how well-drafted the contracts are. There is currently reason to be skeptical of the due
process safeguards in many state contracts with private prisons, but with greater vigilance about

these issues there is no theoretical bar to the use of privately managed prisons. See Warren L.
Ratliff, The Due Process Failure of America's Prison PrivatizationStatutes, 21 SEzr0N HALL
LEGIS. J. 371 (1997).
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The second point is that there is nothing that inherently
makes a state-paid prison guard different from a prison guard paid
from another source. Ultimately the prison guard will be trained
according to the dictates of the state and the source of funds will be
the public fisc. (By contrast, there is no evidence that when the
state orders a shaming punishment, a similar claim of agency can
be made by the state about the crowd.) What should worry us thon
is not whether power is being exercised for profit, 335 but rather

3836
whether power is being exercised properly.
One final point is needed in response to the concern mentioned before about the emotional disposition of the punisher. We
observed earlier that punishment had to be meted out in a manner
that did not deny the moral agency of all those concerned. In the
context of private prisons there is the concern that the administration of punishment will occur with the wrong motive: namely,
profit. But even if private guards were given options in the company's stock, that profit-seeking motivation would not create a necessary friction with the impartial disposition we would wish the
guard to have toward the prisoners. It is not even clear that the
CCR would have something to say here. If we could fully automate
prison services, we probably would not care so long as the prisoners
were treated with decency, a modicum of dignity, and an ability to
337
appeal certain decisions about their confinement.
Perhaps the specter of automated prisons presents an
equally pernicious message to the expressivist critics of private
prisons. Is that message so pernicious as to outweigh the benefits
that might materialize from experiments with private prisons? One
test of the reasonableness of using private prisons would be to contemplate what our judgments would be ex ante, not knowing
whether we would be prisoners or prison guards, legislators or citizens. Using that heuristic, we might prefer something like the confrontational conception, but again, understood within the practicalities of a complex regulatory state operated by and for diverse social
groups. Here is what I take that to look like: knowing it could just

335. This is the concern of critics like Ira Robbins. But as Logan points out, there are pecuni-

ary costs the corporation would face if it exhibited bias improperly one way or the other. For
example, a concern that prison-service corporations would seek to extend unduly the stay of

inmates to maximize the prison population will be addressed by the availability of lawsuits (with
punitive damages attaching) against the corporation, as well as the detriment that a reputation
for malfeasance would bring in future contracting. The prison-services corporation has as much
incentive to keep its nose clean as the prisoners themselves. See LOGAN, supra note 320, at 69.
336. Id. at 64.
337. Cf. id. at 72.
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as easily be me in the prison, I would want to make sure the level of
services and safety was decent and similar in the relevant respects
in either private or publicly managed prisons. Moreover, if there
were a cheaper option that reasonably assured that level of service
and safety, I would prefer that option, all other things being equal,
since as a taxpayer I could be paying for it. In such a scenario, I
would be unlikely to believe that I ended up in prison as a result of
private or profit-seeking motives. (I would, however, want to ensure
the availability of public oversight of my conditions of confinement
so that I did not stay longer in prison due to the prison company's
profit interest in making me stay longer.) This is the familiar distinction between legislation and adjudication on the one hand, and
administration on the other hand. 338 To the extent discretion about

how prisoners will be treated can be constrained by positive law
and contractual obligation, I would not be worried about ending up
in a private prison. After all, a contractually managed prison none339
theless remains a government prison.
Prison-service corporations operate as contractors with the
state. To those unpersuaded by the arguments above, this very notion may be objectionable. But we should not overlook the fact that
most understandings of our own relationship as individuals with
the state reflect a similar contractual nature. The state operates as
the agent of the people, and in that respect, administers the people's opportunity to punish. What reason then is there to explain
"why subsidiary trustees cannot be designated, as long as they, too,
are ultimately accountable to the people and subject to the same
provisions of law that direct the state?" 3 0 To be sure, there are
other entities available-triads, clan leaders, and churchmen, for
example. But whereas these alternative communal agents may be
acceptable on theories (such as restorative justice) that seek to invite broad communal responses to legal wrongdoing, 341 these nonstate parties lack the legitimacy that the state possesses on
grounds of generality and procedural neutrality. With a private
corporation constrained by the principles of the state's interests in

338. I recognize, of course, administrative agencies and regulatory commissions often exercise greater discretion than the kind I am imagining here for private prisons.
339. LOGAN, supra note 320, at 50.
340. Id.
341. See, e.g., Jennifer J. Llewellyn & Robert Howse, Institutionsof Restorative Justice:The
South African Truth and ReconciliationCommission, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 355 (1999).

2240

VANDERBILTLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 54:2157

contract, there seems to be greater reason to keep our minds open
3 42
about private prison administration.
CONCLUSION
Though I believe this Article, in laying out the bare structure
of the CCR, will prod both retributivists and their critics to rethink
their understandings of that theory of punishment, it is not my
chief focus here to explain how and why the CCR is the superior
way to understand the justification of state punishment. That is the
task of another day. My focus, instead, has been to provide an attractive account of retribution that generates practical suggestions
for the alternative sanctions debate. It cannot be emphasized
enough that the ex ante retributivism described here does not require shutting out from consideration other factors that might affect human flourishing, such as the social cost or transparency dimensions. As a result, the CCR gives an organizing framework to
think about punishment, but permits considerations of cost, political accountability, or social reconciliation that are also important
for governing a polity.
The legitimacy of other concerns is a useful bridge to the Article's examination of the alternative sanctions debate. For even if
one is not persuaded by the normative claims I make on behalf of
the CCR, one should still agree with me that the supporters and
opponents of shaming punishments have misunderstood retribution
when they say that shaming punishments are beautifully retributive. This Article identifies the problematic core of this imputation:
a failure to separate conceptually the public expression of moral
condemnation from the communication of repudiating certain
claims of superiority by the offender, and the concomitant failure to
separate revenge from retribution. As I have shown, the internal
goods of retribution can be achieved in substantial part without
broad public expression. Because shaming punishments occur without an emotional or intellectual disposition appropriate to the animating principles of retributivism, and because they aim at the destruction of a person's reputation and self-worth, they are punishments antithetical to the idea of retribution and, relatedly, the most
attractive theories of liberalism.

342. Note that the grounds of generality and procedural neutrality serve as functional catogories. As Logan reminds us, when a publicly employed prison guard engages in brutal behavior,
his acts are illegal and unauthorized. The same would go for a privately employed prison guard.
What matters is the derivation of authority and the act made under that authority. See LOGAN,
supranote 320, at 54.
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I have tried to show that although retribution is incompatible with shaming punishments, retributivists might still have
something constructive to say about alternatives to the publicly
managed prison. It is precisely because retribution is only one attractive practice among other attractive practices within a complex
scheme of general and fair political obligation that one has the responsibility to engage seriously those who express concern about
cost or institutional transparency, to name just two reasonable concerns. This speaks to the justification for experimentation with private prisons on retributivist grounds, as well as guilt punishments.
By referring back to the underlying goals and overarching principles of retributivism, we found that there are arguments to be proffered on behalf of certain alternative sanctions.
Our imaginations can extend further. Canada, for example,
now employs something called a conditional sentence, 3 which condemns certain nonviolent offenders to house arrest if they ake not
at work and subjects the offenders to constant monitoring. If the
offenders violate their conditions, they go to prison. While there is
no reason to think that these alternatives are necessitated by the
CCR, they almost certainly lie within its zone of compatibility;
therefore, those who view themselves as retributivists should pay
special concern to other legitimate considerations in the decision
process.
The sketch of punishment offered here is a project in philosophy, law, and ultimately, social hope. By elaborating upon the
ideas of retributivism-what it demands, permits, and proscribes-I
hope I will have chastened the at times imperialistic tendencies of
both retributivists and their critics. I hope the portrait of retribution I have supplied will call into question various notions held by
those who self-identify as retributivists. I hope that everyone, but
especially retributivists, will realize this: Punishment can be ennobling, for both the punishing and the punished, but a spirit of modesty should temper our punishing inclinations-we are, after all,
only human, all too human. A discourse and practice of punishment
that reflected that sad fact better would look considerably more attractive.
One disquieting and last thought: to the extent that the account of retribution offered here is of any value, it spurs reconsideration not only of the world of alternative sanctions, but also of
current doctrine and mainstream practice with respect to criminal
343. This was the recent subject of an important Canadian Supreme Court decision. See Regina v. Proulx, [2000] S.C.R. 61.
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procedure and incarceration. The enormous and (judicially) unreviewable discretion prosecutors in this country enjoy, the reluctant
manner with which judges deny bail even though technological devices are cheap alternatives to jail, the teeming and squalid state of
our prisons, and the humiliating rituals prisoners often undergoall these are at odds with the picture of retribution suggested here.
The state of our prisons is of particular significance especially in
light of the critique I offered of shaming punishments. For although
a sentence to prison should not be interpreted as involving the directly intentional humiliation of another person, time in prison very
often involves these practices as a matter of reality. And one cannot
plausibly disclaim responsibility for fully foreseeable effects. Thus
it should come as no surprise that quite a bit more than the future
of "alternative sanctions" is at stake if we are to realize any of the
promise that might inhere in the vision of retribution I have tried
to articulate.

